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CONTEMPT SANCTIONS
AND THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE
MARGARET MERIWETHER CORDRAY*
Few aspects of the American justice system are as susceptible to
abuse as contempt of court, where the roles of victim, prosecutor,
and jury are all combined in one person, and that person is the
trial judge. Contempt powers give judges almost unlimited power
to impose devastating fines on parties and attorneys and, even
more disturbing, these powers have gone without constitutional
review. This lack of review is not surprising, because the pertinent
constitutional provision, the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, has itself gone virtually without judicial comment for
most of the two hundred years since the adoption of the Bill of
Rights. The Supreme Court, however, has recently broken this
long silence and has begun to define the scope of the Eighth
Amendment in cases involving punitive damages and forfeitures of
property connected with the commission of a crime. Professor
Margaret Meriwether Cordray argues that this infant Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence should also open the way for
constitutional review, under the Excessive Fines Clause, of the
penalties imposed for contempt of court. Professor Cordray first
examines the often confusing categories of contempt sanctions,
focusing on the breadth of the courts' power in the areas of
criminal contempt and coercive civil contempt. She then considers
whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to contempt fines. In
doing so, she discusses the history of the Excessive Fines Clause,
as well as the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the Clause's
scope and meaning. Professor Cordray then analyzes, in light of
both the historical understanding of contempt law and its current
operation, whether criminal contempt sanctions or coerceive civil
contempt sanctions are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause, and
she concludes that both are sufficiently punitive in nature to trigger
application of the Clause. Finally, Professor Cordray suggests a
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framework for analyzing whether particular contempt fines are
constitutionally excessive.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contempt fines, especially those imposed to coerce compliance
with court orders, are a judicial tool that is peculiarly subject to abuse.
Contempt law is unique in that it allows the judge to perform not only
the traditional judicial function, but also legislative and executive
functions. In contempt cases, judges thus enjoy an unparalleled
concentration of power: judges define the offense, initiate the
prosecution, and determine the sanction. And because defendants
are entitled to a jury trial only in criminal contempt cases, the
contempt power is even more sweeping in coercive civil contempt
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cases, in which the offended judge also serves as the factfinder and
adjudicator.
Despite the potential for abuse of such vast power, there are at
present no meaningful restrictions on a court's ability to impose
severe, even devastating, monetary sanctions on a contempt
defendant. In the last decade, however, the Supreme Court has
issued four important decisions that, for the first time, interpret the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.! These cases
suggest that the Excessive Fines Clause may provide a new avenue
for checking the courts' power to impose fines of virtually any
magnitude on contempt defendants.
This Article examines whether the Excessive Fines Clause
applies to contempt sanctions, and particularly to coercive civil
contempt sanctions. In doing so, the Article begins with a review of
contempt law, looking primarily at the distinction between criminal
and civil contempt and at the special attributes of coercive civil
contempt. The Article then discusses the purpose and scope of the
Excessive Fines Clause. In that regard, the Article focuses on the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in the area, which emphasize that
the applicability of the Clause turns on whether the sanction
constitutes punishment.
Following this overview, the Article considers whether the
Excessive Fines Clause imposes a constitutional limit on the size of
contempt sanctions. In analyzing this issue, the Article first addresses
the relatively straightforward question of whether the Clause applies
to criminal contempt sanctions, and concludes that the explicitly
punitive nature of criminal contempt sanctions brings them easily
within the purview of the Clause. The Article then considers the
much more difficult question of whether the Excessive Fines Clause
applies to coercive civil contempt sanctions, and concludes that
though such sanctions also serve remedial objectives, they are
sufficiently punitive in purpose and practice to trigger application of
the Clause. Finally, the Article identifies and discusses the pertinent
factors that courts should consider in determining whether a
particular contempt sanction is constitutionally excessive.
1. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has considered the Excessive Fines Clause in United
States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996), Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993),
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), and Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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II. TMHE CONTEMPT SANCrION
The courts' power to punish litigants for contempt is essential to
preserving both the authority of courts and the integrity of court
orders. Indeed, "[c]ontempt makes injunctions work."3 Because of
its necessity, a broad contempt power has long been considered
within the inherent authority of the courts.4 Over the years, as courts
have sought to exercise the contempt power for different purposes in
many and various cases, they have developed a vast and complicated
body of contempt law.
A. The Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt
Courts have traditionally divided contempts into two general
categories: criminal contempt and civil contempt The civil category
is then further divided into compensatory civil contempt and coercive
civil contempt.
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt "turns on
'the character...' of the sanction" imposed . In the Supreme Court's
leading case on the subject, Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,' it
articulated the distinction as follows: If the sanction is remedial-for
the benefit of the injured party-then the contempt is civil; if, on the
2. See, e.g., International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831
(1994) ("Courts independently must be vested with 'power to impose silence, respect, and
decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates ....'" (quoting
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821), but altering the punctuation); Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911) ("[T]he power of courts to punish for
contempts is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is
absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on them by law.").
3. OWEN M. FIss & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 1004 (2d ed. 1984); see also
id. at 1004-12 (discussing the importance of contempt, and particularly coercive civil
contempt, in protecting the plaintiff's substantive rights); Douglas Rendleman, How to
Enforce an Injunction, LITIG., Fall 1983, at 23,24 (same).
4. See, e.g., Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831 (citing cases); Gompers, 221 U.S. at 450 (citing
cases).
5. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826-27; Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988);
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441. See generally Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 183,235 (1971) (discussing the forms of contempt).
6. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827-28 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441); see also Hicks,
485 U.S. at 631 (explaining that the character of the sanction determines whether a
contempt is civil or criminal). Although traditionally the courts looked exclusively to the
form of the sanction in order to determine whether the contempt was criminal or civil, in
Bagwell, the Supreme Court indicated that in some circumstances it is necessary for the
courts to perform a more substantive review of the content and effect of the contempt
sanctions in order to determine whether the contempt was criminal in nature. See
Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 836-38. Although this holding is sound, it promises to add further
complexity to what has already proved to be a very difficult area of the law.
7. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
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other hand, the sanction is punitive-to vindicate the court's
authority-then the contempt is criminal! Thus, in general, a
contempt sanction is criminal if it imposes punishment for past
conduct, usually imprisonment or a fine in a fixed amount.9 A
contempt sanction is compensatory civil if it is designed to
compensate the other party for losses sustained as a result of the
contemnor's contumacious conduct.10 And a contempt sanction is
coercive civil if it is a conditional penalty designed to coerce
compliance with the court's order.11
The third form of contempt--coercive civil contempt-is
considered civil in nature even though the contemnor may be
imprisoned or fined, and any fines assessed are typically payable to
the court.1 2 This characterization has prevailed because the penalty is
specified in advance and is conditional, so that the contemnor can
avoid the penalty (whether imprisonment or a fine) simply by
complying with the court's order. The sanction has thus been treated
as remedial, because its purpose is to compel the contemnor to
comply with the requirements of the court's order. 3
Nevertheless, because the sanction for coercive contempt bears
many of the characteristics of criminal punishment, Gompers's
"purpose of the sanction" test for distinguishing between civil and
criminal contempt has proved remarkably difficult to apply.'4 Indeed,
8. See id. at 441; see also Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631 (also using the distinction articulated
in Gompers). In Gompers, the Court also suggested that other factors-such as whether a
private party or a government attorney commenced the proceeding, whether the order
was mandatory or prohibitory, and how the contempt petition was styled-might also
affect the classification of a contempt as civil or criminal. See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442-
48. These factors, however, have not proved influential. See, e.g., Bagwell, 512 U.S. at
827-28, 835 (relying on Gompers's "purpose of the sanction" test, and distancing itself
from the "mandatory/prohibitory decree" factor); Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631-32 (relying on
Gompers' "purpose of the sanction" test); see also Dobbs, supra note 5, at 241 (noting
that the other factors suggested in Gompers "are not very important because they seldom
if ever directly affect results of cases; courts do not follow [these factors] even when they
state them").
9. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632-33; Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442-43.
10. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631-32; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258,303-04 (1947).
11. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632-33; United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-04.
12. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632; Thomas J. Andrd, Jr., The Final Judgment Rule and
Party Appeals of Civil Contempt Orders: Time for a Change, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1041,
1051 n.66 (1980); see also New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339,
1353-54 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting district court's decision to have the coercive fine paid to
plaintiffs, and instead requiring that it be paid to the court).
13. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631-33; United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-04; Gompers,
221 U.S. at 441-42.
14. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New
1998]
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even the Court in Gompers itself recognized that a neat line cannot
be drawn between contempt sanctions imposed as criminal
punishment and those imposed for remedial purposes:
It is true that either form of [contempt sanction] has also an
incidental effect. For if the case is civil and the punishment
is purely remedial, there is also a vindication of the court's
authority. On the other hand, if the proceeding is for
criminal contempt and the imprisonment is solely punitive,
to vindicate the authority of the law, the complainant may
also derive some incidental benefit from the fact that such
punishment tends to prevent a repetition of the
disobedience. 5
The difficulty of separating sanctions that are coercive from
those that are criminal has been exacerbated in recent decades, as the
variety of coercive sanctions has greatly expanded, encroaching ever
more deeply into the traditionally criminal realm. Until relatively
recently, coercive contempt sanctions were generally limited to
situations in which the court sought compliance with some simple
affirmative requirement, such as testifying or turning over a
document.16 If the defendant refused to comply, the court would
imprison or fine the defendant until he complied. 7
Modem courts, however, have used both injunctions and
coercive contempt sanctions much more aggressively. 18 In addition to
the more traditional uses, courts have, for example, imprisoned
Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1047-49 (1993)
(stating that the civil/criminal distinction is "confusing, difficult to apply, and ultimately
unresponsive to the most serious concerns engendered by the contempt process"); see also
Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827 n.3, 830 (noting that many scholars "have criticized as
unworkable the traditional distinction" and describing the distinction as "somewhat
elusive"); Andr6, supra note 12, at 1048-52 (criticizing the distinction between civil and
criminal contempt); Joseph Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 780,780-81 (1943) (same).
15. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443; see also Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828 (noting the overlap
between civil and criminal contempt sanctions); Hicks, 485 U.S. at 635-36 (same).
16. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 840-42 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that, at common
law, civil contempt was generally used in conjunction with "'single act' mandates [where
compliance] could, in addition to being simple, be quick" (quoting HENRY L.
MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 915 (2d ed. 1948)));
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442-43 (providing examples of simple affirmative acts that were
proper subjects of coercive contempt).
17. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 840-41 (Scalia, J., concurring).
18. See id. at 842 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Contemporary courts have abandoned
these earlier limitations upon the scope of their mandatory and injunctive decrees."); see
also Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165,207-08 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (describing
the "incredible transformation and growth" of contempt law), overruled in part by Bloom
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
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defendants or imposed daily fines to exact compliance with complex
orders;' 9 they have imposed determinate sentences, suspended on
condition of compliance;' and they have announced comprehensive
prospective fine schedules to obtain compliance with the various
requirements of multi-faceted decrees.2
Although the difference between civil and criminal contempt is,
by the Supreme Court's own description, "elusive,"' much turns on
this distinction. As discussed in more detail below, over the last half
century, the Supreme Court has provided criminal contempt
19. See, e.g., New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1351 (2d
Cir. 1989) (district court announced sanction of $25,000 for each subsequent daily
violation of its detailed order prohibiting anti-abortion demonstrations); United States v.
Work Wear Corp., 602 F.2d 110, 113-14 (6th Cir. 1979) (district court announced fine of
$5000 per day until contemnor complied with order requiring it to divest itself of eight
industrial laundries); United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., No. 81-
1805, 1982 WL 121560, at *2 (D.D.C. May 18, 1982) (district court announced an
escalating schedule of daily fines pending compliance with its no-strike orders).
20. See, e.g., Hicks, 485 U.S. at 639-41 (trial court imposed jail sentence on defendant
who failed to pay child support, but then suspended the sentence, placed the defendant on
probation, and imposed the condition that defendant make specified payments on his
arrearage; Supreme Court held that, if this was "a determinate sentence with a purge
clause, then it is civil in nature"); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 366-70 (1966)
(trial court imposed determinate two-year prison sentences on defendants for refusing to
testify, but indicated that they would be released when they testified); Jencks v. Goforth,
261 P.2d 655, 655-57, 661 (N.M. 1953) (trial court imposed $4000 fine and 90-day prison
sentence on defendants for violating injunction that barred various activities, including
trespassing and blocking roads, but added that half the fine and all the jail sentence would
be remitted or suspended if no further violations occurred during the following year);
Dobbs, supra note 5, at 244 ("Courts often blur the distinction between determinate and
indeterminate sentences. One device that blurs the distinction-some might say
obliterates it-is the sentence that is determinate in form, but that is suspended on
condition of compliance.").
21. See, e.g., Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 824 (trial court announced fines of $100,000 for any
future violent breach of the injunction and $20,000 for any future non-violent breach);
Aradia Women's Health Ctr. v. Operation Rescue, 929 F.2d 530, 531 (9th Cir. 1991)
(district court announced fines of $500 per violation for each violation of its order
enjoining defendants "'from blocking access to abortion facilities and other activities in
the state'" (quoting the district court injunction)); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857,
862-63, 869 (3rd Cir. 1990) (district court imposed fines of $5000 for each past violation of
the court's order prohibiting a variety of harassing activities; court then suspended those
fines conditional on no future violations and also announced a prospective fine of $5000
for each future violation).
In Bagwell, the Supreme Court seemed to disapprove of this practice, stating that
"the fact that the trial court announced the fines before the contumacy, rather than after
the fact, does not in itself justify respondents' conclusion that the fines are civil or
meaningfully distinguish these penalties from the ordinary criminal law." Bagwell, 512
U.S. at 836. Ultimately, the Court determined that the sanctions in that case were "more
closely analogous to fixed, determinate, retrospective criminal fines which petitioners had
no opportunity to purge once imposed." Id. at 837.
22. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 830.
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defendants with almost all of the procedural protections generally
afforded to defendants in criminal cases, such as the right to a jury
trial and the right to conviction only by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.23 Defendants in civil contempt proceedings, however, receive
virtually none of these enhanced protections, but instead are limited
to the procedures used in ordinary civil proceedings.2 4
B. The Potential for Judicial Abuse
Although the contempt power is of unquestionable importance
in maintaining the authority of the courts and securing the rights of
plaintiffs who have been granted injunctive relief, this broad power is
uniquely "' "liable to abuse." ' "2' The potential for abuse stems from
the fact that, in this one area, legislative, executive, and judicial
powers are joined. Thus, the judge, rather than the legislature,
defines the offense and sets the penalty; the judge, rather than a
representative of the executive, decides whether to pursue
prosecution; and this same judge, rather than some neutral member
of the judiciary, acts as adjudicator."
Investing so much power in one person would be problematic in
any circumstance, but in the contempt arena, the problem is
exacerbated by the fact that "[c]ontemptuous conduct, though a
public wrong, often strikes at the most vulnerable and human
qualities of a judge's temperament." '' Indeed, at least in cases
23. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (describing the procedural
protections afforded to criminal contempt defendants).
24. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827; Dobbs, supra note 5, at 235; Philip A. Hostak, Note,
International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell: A Paradigm Shift in the
Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 181, 184 (1995).
25. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831 (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968)
(quoting Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888))). Despite its potential for abuse,
however, the importance of the contempt power is widely acknowledged. See id. at 831-
32; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,450 (1911); FISS & RENDLEMAN,
supra note 3, at 1004-12.
26. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831 (describing the "fusion of legislative, executive, and
judicial powers" in civil contempt proceedings); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-26
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (warning that "where the whole power of
one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another
department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted"); Felix
Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal
Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 1010, 1056 (1924) (noting that, in contempt cases, there are "subtle dangers of bias,
unconsciously operating, owing to inevitable human infirmities where one person
combines in himself the roles of accuser, trier of facts and intentions, and judge").
27. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202. Justice Black noted in his dissent in Green:
No official, regardless of his position or the purity and nobleness of his character,
[Vol. 76
CONTEMPT SANCTIONS
involving criminal or civil coercive contempt, imposition of the
contempt sanction is so closely centered on the need for the court-
and the individual judge-to vindicate its own authority that the
judge is "obviously incapable of holding the scales of justice perfectly
fair and true and reflecting impartially on the guilt or innocence of
the accused."
Largely because of these concerns, the Supreme Court has
extended the right to a jury trial, and thus the right to a neutral and
objective factfinder, to defendants in criminal contempt cases.' The
Court has likewise ensured that the defendant in a criminal contempt
case enjoys virtually all of the other standard constitutional
safeguards, including the protection against double jeopardy,30 the
right to trial in open court,3' the right to notice of the charges against
him, the right to have the assistance of counsel, the right to present a
defense,' the right against self-incrimination, the presumption of
innocence, and the right to conviction only by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.33
The Court, however, has consistently refused to extend these
basic safeguards to defendants subject to coercive contempt charges.'
But as Professor Earl Dudley has persuasively argued, the concerns
about judicial bias are at least as strong in the coercive contempt
context:
There is, however, no reason to believe that the pervasive
difficulties afflicting the contempt process are absent
should be granted such autocratic omnipotence.... Like all the rest of mankind
[judges] may be affected from time to time by pride and passion, by pettiness and
bruised feelings, by improper understanding or by excessive zeal.
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 198 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled in part
by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
28. Green, 356 U.S. at 199 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Joseph H. Beale, Jr.,
Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARV. L. REv. 161, 172 (1908) (discussing the
problem of judicial bias); Dudley, supra note 14, at 1062-63, 1066-67 (same); Hostak,
supra note 24, at 196 (same).
29. See Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201-09.
30. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688,695-96 (1993).
31. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,278 (1948).
32. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,537 (1925).
33. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911). But see
Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 104 (1924) (holding that the normal provisions on
venue do not apply in contempt cases). See generally International Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826-27 (1994) (discussing the procedural protections
afforded to criminal contempt defendants); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632 (1988)
(same); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798-99 (1987)
(same).
34. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831.
1998]
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whenever the sanction chosen is civil in form. A judge
offended by perceived flouting of his authority or harboring
a jaundiced view of a party against whom he has already
ruled on the underlying merits is no less likely to resolve
factual issues in a biased manner simply because he chooses
ultimately to impose a sanction designed to coerce
obedience rather than expressly to punish. Moreover, the
concerns arising from the unlimited nature of the
sanctioning power are hardly diminished-indeed, they may
be elevated-in civil contempt. By carefully crafting the
sanction, a biased judge can drastically limit the procedural
protections afforded the accused contemnor, foreclose any
claim to a jury (thereby cloaking his factual findings with the
protection of the "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate
review), and possibly truncate the contemnor's right of
appeal-all without losing much, if anything, in the way of
punitive impact.'
Nonetheless, despite this grave danger of biased use of the
coercive contempt power, the Supreme Court has insisted on treating
the contemnor as a civil, and not a criminal, defendant.3
C. The Breadth of Judicial Power to Impose Coercive Contempt
Sanctions
Although only the minimal civil protections apply in coercive
contempt proceedings, the ability of judges to impose severe, even
crushing, coercive sanctions is not constrained in any significant way.
In the federal and most state systems, there is no cap on the amount
that a court may sanction a contempt defendant, as long as the
sanction is designed to coerce complianceY Not surprisingly, the
35. Dudley, supra note 14, at 1062-63. Professor Doug Rendleman has also noted the
potential for abuse:
Coercive confinement has an awesome potential for abuse. Power to imprison is
concentrated in a single trial judge. The usual checks against abuse that precede
criminal imprisonment, including a grand jury indictment, prosecutorial
discretion, a jury trial for a sentence of greater than six months, the presumption
of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the opportunity for an
executive pardon, are absent before coercive confinement begins.
Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt Confinement: The Terminally
Stubborn Contemnor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 185,190 (1991).
36. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827; Dobbs, supra note 5, at 235; Hostak, supra note 24,
at 184.
37. See Dudley, supra note 14, at 1026-27 & n.6. The only federal statute limiting the
severity of coercive contempt sanctions is 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1994), which provides that
a federal court may confine a recalcitrant witness for a maximum of 18 months. Most
state statutes impose no upper limit on coercive contempt sanctions, providing only that
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absence of any meaningful check on the courts' sanctioning power has
led, in some instances, to the announcement of staggering coercive
fines.' For example, in New York Times Co. v. Newspaper & Mail
Deliverers' Union,39 the district court announced that it would fine the
defendant union $100,000 for every hour that it continued to obstruct
delivery of the newspaper, and $500,000 for every hour in which it
obstructed delivery of the newspaper's Sunday edition. In
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States,4' the district
court stated that it would fine IBM $150,000 per day until it complied
with a discovery order.4' And in United States v. Russotti4 3 the district
court announced that a police officer who refused to disclose the
name of his informant would be fined for each day of continued
refusal in an amount starting at $100 per day and then doubling each
day until a maximum of $50,000 was reached.44
the judge may imprison the contemnor until he or she complies with the court's order.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1219 (West 1994); IDAHO CODE § 7-611 (1996); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 600.1715(2) (1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-1-17 (1996). But cf. WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 785.04 (West 1997) (limiting coercive imprisonment to six months and coercive
fines to $2000 per day, unless the court "expressly finds that those sanctions would be
ineffectual to terminate a continuing contempt of court").
38. In Professor Dudley's words, coercive sanctions can be "breathtakingly severe."
Dudley, supra note 14, at 1027 n.6.
39. No. 92 Civ. 3345,1992 WL 110721 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,1992).
40. See id. at *3.
41. 493 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1973).
42. See id. at 114.
43. 746 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1984).
44. See id. at 948-49. The Second Circuit, however, overturned the contempt
sanctions on grounds unrelated to the severity of the fine schedule. See id. at 950. Many
other cases have involved large coercive fines. See, e.g., International Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 824 (1994) (trial court had announced a fine of $100,000
for every future violent breach and $20,000 for every future nonviolent breach; fines
amounted to $64 million; Supreme Court held that the fines would be treated as criminal
in nature); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1351 (2d Cir.
1989) (district court announced sanction of $25,000 for each subsequent daily violation of
its order prohibiting anti-abortion demonstrations; the court also permitted the sanction to
be assessed against Randall Terry, Operation Rescue's leader, personally); United States
Catholic Conference v. Baker, 824 F.2d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 1987) (district court announced
fine of $50,000 per day until witnesses testified), rev'd on other grounds sub norm. United
States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988);
United States v. Work Wear Corp., 602 F.2d 110, 113-14 (6th Cir. 1979) (district court
announced fine of $5000 per day until contemnor complied with divestiture order,
$1,035,000 in fines accumulated); New York Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 445
F.2d 39, 44 nn.3-4 (2d Cir. 1971) (district court announced escalating fines of up to
$100,000 per day until union terminated the strike); In re Caucus Distribs., Inc., 83 B.R.
921, 927-28 (E.D. Va. 1988) ($16 million in contempt fines; court declined to discuss or
decide whether the fines were criminal or civil); United States v. Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Org., 525 F. Supp. 820, 821 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (district court announced fine of
$100,000 per day against union until strike was terminated; court vacated its own fines
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Moreover, the severity of the coercive fines that the trial courts
impose is not carefully policed by the appellate courts. First, only
loose guidelines govern the trial court's decision as to the amount of a
coercive fine. In United States v. United Mine Workers,4 the Supreme
Court suggested that the lower courts should consider a variety of
factors, including (1) "the character and magnitude of the harm
threatened by continued contumacy"; (2) "the probable effectiveness
of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired"; and
(3) "the amount of defendant's financial resources and the
consequent seriousness of the burden to that particular defendant."
46
Aside from these very general considerations, however, the Court has
contented itself with frequent but vague reiteration of the general
principle that "in wielding its contempt powers, a court 'must exercise
"the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." ' 107
In reviewing the severity of coercive sanctions, moreover, both
federalr and state49 appellate courts use only the generous "abuse of
discretion" standard." Although appellate courts have, on occasion,
because Government made compliance impossible by firing all striking employees).
45. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
46. Id. at 304. In United Mine Workers, the lower court had imposed a determinate
fine of $3.5 million against the defendant union for nationwide strike activities. See id. at
269. The Supreme Court, finding that the fine was excessive as a determinate criminal
fine, exercised its inherent authority to reduce it to $700,000, but then reimposed the
remaining $2.8 million as a coercive fine, which the union could purge by compliance with
the court's order. See id. at 304-05.
47. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 637 n.8 (1988) (quoting Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364,371 (1966) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204,231 (1821))).
48. Federal courts employ the "abuse of discretion" standard. See United States v.
Berg, 20 F.3d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 91-
02922, 955 F.2d 670, 673 (11th Cir. 1992); Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 953 F.2d
510, 515 (9th Cir. 1992); Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1304
(11th Cir. 1991); Lamar Fin. Corp. v. Adams, 918 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Darwin Constr. Co., 873 F.2d 750, 756 (4th Cir. 1989); N.A. Sales Co. v.
Chapman Indus. Corp., 736 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir. 1984); Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme
Quilting Co., 673 F.2d 53,57 (2d Cir. 1982).
49. State courts also employ the "abuse of discretion" standard. See Williams v.
Stumpe, 439 So. 2d 1297, 1299 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983); O'Neill v. Carolina Freight Carriers
Corp., 239 A.2d 693, 694 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1967); City of Honolulu v. Kailua Auto
Wreckers, Inc., 668 P.2d 34, 35 (Haw. 1983); Marks v. Vehlow, 671 P.2d 473, 481 (Idaho
1983); Arch Med. Assocs., Inc. v. Bartlett Health Enters., Inc., 589 N.E.2d 1251, 1254
(Mass. App. Ct. 1992); In re Graveley, 614 P.2d 1033, 1040 (Mont. 1980); Fenstamaker v.
Fenstamaker, 487 A.2d 11, 16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); State v. Price, 672 A.2d 893, 898 (R.I.
1996); In re Marriage of Mathews, 853 P.2d 462, 469 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); Yamaha
Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Harris, 631 P.2d 423,428 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
50. See Dudley, supra note 14, at 1028 n.6 (noting that, although the severity of the
contempt sanction is reviewable on appeal, "the efficacy of this review is curtailed both by
limitations on the appealability of some contempts ... and by the deference traditionally
accorded the trial court's choice of sanction by the reviewing court"); Louis Raveson, A
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reduced the size of coercive fines,5' this deferential standard has been
applied to give the lower courts broad leeway in choosing the amount
of the coercive sanction.2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently
noted that the federal courts and state courts have "relied on [United]
Mine Workers to authorize a relatively unlimited judicial power to
impose noncompensatory civil contempt fines."'53
There is thus, at present, a troubling lack of meaningful
constraints on the power of the courts to impose severe contempt
sanctions. And because of the long-standing judicial treatment of
coercive contempt as a civil matter, the problem is especially acute
with respect to coercive sanctions, since the courts' power is not even
checked by the standard criminal procedural protections.
In view of the pressing need for some protection against
potential judicial abuse, it is worthwhile to consider whether the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment imposes a
constitutional limit on the amount that a court may fine a contemnor
in criminal and coercive civil contempt cases. Indeed, this inquiry is
especially timely because, in the last decade, the Supreme Court has
pulled the Clause out of obscurity, considering its scope and
application in four important new casesM Before turning to an
analysis of whether the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause
extends to contempt sanctions, some background on the history and
meaning of the Clause is useful.
New Perspective on the Judicial Contempt Power: Recommendations for Reform, 18
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1, 18-20 & n.69 (1990) (noting that the standard of review in both
state and federal courts is "abuse of discretion"); Hostak, supra note 24, at 184 (stating
that "there is ordinarily no limit to a court's civil sanctioning authority").
51. For instance, in United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990), the Second
Circuit held that the district court had exceeded its discretion. See id. at 460. The district
court had set a fine schedule under which fines against the defendant city were to start at
$100 per day and double every day of noncompliance. See id. The Second Circuit, noting
that the fine for day 25 would be more than $1 billion, and the fine for day 30 more than
$50 billion, capped the maximum daily fine at (a still steep) $1 million per day. See id.
52. See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 830
(1994); cf. Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34,38 (2d. Cir. 1983) (stating that a trial judge
has "virtually unreviewable discretion" to determine whether the contempt sanction may
yet coerce).
53. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 830.
54. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996); Alexander v. United States,
509 U.S. 544 (1993); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); Browning-Ferris Indus.
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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III. THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE
A. A Brief History of the Clause
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."-5 Although there was almost no debate over
the Excessive Fines Clause, or even about the Eighth Amendment as
a whole, in the First Congress,56 history shows that the provision was
included in an effort to secure for Americans the same rights and
liberties that British subjects traditionally enjoyed." In interpreting
the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has thus regularly looked
to the Amendment's antecedents in British legal history."
The origins of the Eighth Amendment date back to the English
Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689.'9 In the wake of the Glorious
Revolution of 1688-89, when the English people deposed James II
and elevated William III and Mary II to the throne, important new
limitations were placed on royal authority.60 These limitations were
set forth in the Declaration of Rights and were codified into law in its
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VHI.
56. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753-54 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). What little debate
there was regarding the Excessive Fines Clause consisted only of a question raised and
addressed about whether the words "nor cruel and unusual punishments" were too
indefinite. See icL at 754. The entire amendment generated little more discussion other
than one other short comment on the excessive bail provision. See id.; see also Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910) (noting the lack of debate over the Eighth
Amendment); Gerald W. Boston, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment:
Application ofthe Excessive Fines Clause, 5 COOLEY L. REv. 667,703 (1988) (same).
57. See H.D. Hazeltine, The Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional
Development, in MAGNA CARTA COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 180, 184-85 (Henry Elliot
Malden ed., 1917); Philip B. Kurland, Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in the United
States: "The Noble Lie," in THE GREAT CHARTER 48, 57 (1965); Calvin R. Massey, The
Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 1233, 1241-43 (1987); see also Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267 ("The Framers of our
Bill of Rights were aware and took account of the abuses that led to the 1689 Bill of
Rights."); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) ("Although the Framers may have
intended the Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their
use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to
provide at least the same protection-including the right to be free from excessive
punishments.").
58. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 266-68 (considering the Eighth
Amendment's English counterpart in interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause); Solem, 463
U.S. at 277, 284-86 & n.10 (considering the Eighth Amendment's English counterpart in
interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 664-65 (1977) (same).
59. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 266-67; Solem, 463 U.S. at 285-86.
60. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267; Massey, supra note 57, at 1243-56.
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statutory counterpart, the Bill of Rights.6' Article 10 of both the
Declaration and Bill of Rights contained prohibitions against
excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. 62
This provision was directly copied into the Virginia Declaration of
Rights of 1776, which in turn served as the model for the Eighth
Amendment.63
The prohibition against excessive fines in Article 10 of the 1689
Declaration and Bill of Rights was designed to accomplish two
purposes. First, it reaffirmed the protection provided in Magna Carta
against excessive amercements-financial penalties assessed by juries
for a wide variety of misconduct, both civil and criminal.,4 Second,
Article 10 afforded new protection against fines imposed by judges on
their own authority, without consideration by a jury.6
This new protection against judicially imposed fines was
regarded as necessary because of staggering abuses that had been
perpetrated by seventeenth-century judges, who often acted as mere
tools to implement the royal will.' To augment their authority, these
judges had decided that the restrictions on excessive amercements
laid down in Magna Carta applied only to fines imposed by juries6 7
This interpretation freed the judges from any restrictions whatsoever
on their own power to impose fines. Having granted themselves this
61. See generally LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 19-
29 (1981) (describing generally the Declaration of Rights).
62. Article 10 provided: "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." See SCHWOERER, supra
note 61, at 21 (quoting Article 10); id. at 87 (also quoting and discussing Article 10).
63. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 266-67; SCHWOERER, supra note 61, at 289-90;
Massey, supra note 57, at 1240-41.
64. For helpful discussions of the history of amercements and Magna Carta's
protections against abusive use of the amercement power, see J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA
230 (1965), WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE
GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 287-94 (2d ed. 1914), 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK &
FREDERIC WILLIAM MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD I 513-15 (2d ed. 1923), and Boston, supra note 56, at 710-28. The gradual
evolution of amercements into modem-day fines is described, infra, at notes 130-38.
65. See SCHVOERER, supra note 61, at 91. Professor Lois Schwoerer's book provides
a comprehensive description and discussion not only of the terms of the Declaration of
Rights, but also of the political context in which the document was born.
66. See SCHWOERER, supra note 61, at 91; Massey, supra note 57, at 1253-54.
67. See SCHVOERER, supra note 61, at 91 (describing the confusion over whether
Magna Carta applied to judicially imposed fines); Massey, supra note 57, at 1263-64
(noting that "[b]y the Glorious Revolution, James II's judges had determined that the
Magna Charta afforded no protection whatsoever from fines"). On the particularly
profound abuses of the judges during the reign of James II, see generally 1 THOMAS
BABINGTON MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES THE
SECOND 421-658 (1899), and 2 id. at 1-155.
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unfettered discretion, the judges (spurred on by the kings who
controlled them) wielded their power with abandon, imposing
outrageous, and often ruinous, fines on their critics and the royal
enemies.'
The driving force behind Article 10 of the English Declaration
and Bill of Rights was thus a desire to rein in these judges. As the
Supreme Court has summarized the historical record: "The English
version [of the Eighth Amendment], adopted after the accession of
William and Mary, was intended to curb the excesses of English
judges under the reign of James R."69 This understanding of the
impetus behind the Eighth Amendment and its direct precursor in
British law has served as an important guide for the Supreme Court in
applying the provisions of the Eighth Amendment."
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Clause
Although the Supreme Court has issued a number of decisions
concerning the bail and punishments clauses of the Eighth
Amendment, it did not specifically consider the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment for more than two hundred years.'
In 1989, however, the Court issued the first of four decisions that have
provided significant insight into the scope and meaning of the Clause.
In the first case, Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc.,'2 the Court was confronted with the question of whether the
Excessive Fines Clause imposes a constitutional limit on the size of
punitive damages awards?73 Relying heavily on the history and
purpose of the Eighth Amendment, a divided Court held that the
68. See SCHVOERER, supra note 61, at 91-92 (describing examples); Massey, supra
note 57, at 1253-54 (same).
69. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 267 (1989) (noting that the Eighth Amendment's
English counterpart was designed to curb the abuses by the English judges); SCHVOERER,
supra note 61, at 87, 91 (same).
70. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262-72 (holding that the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to awards of punitive damages to private parties); Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-86 (1983) (interpreting the Eighth Amendment to contain a
principle of proportionality for prison sentences); Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664-66 (holding
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not apply to corporal punishment in
schools).
71. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262 ("[T]his Court has never considered an
application of the Excessive Fines Clause."); see also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602, 606 (1993) ("We have had occasion to consider this Clause only once before [in
Browning-Ferris].").
72. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
73. See id. at 259.
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Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to an award of punitive
damages in a civil case between private parties.'
Then in 1993, the Court reviewed a pair of cases involving the
Excessive Fines Clause. In Alexander v. United States,75 the Court
considered whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to criminal
forfeitures, that is, to forfeitures of property imposed as punishment
for a criminal offense.76 The Court concluded that the protections of
the Clause do extend to criminal forfeitures, reasoning that they are
"clearly a form of monetary punishment no different, for Eighth
Amendment purposes, from a traditional 'fine.' "7 In the other case,
Austin v. United States,78 the Court went further still. Austin
presented the issue of whether the Excessive Fines Clause also
applies to civil in rem forfeitures, that is, to forfeitures of property
that are based on the property's use in the commission of a crime,
rather than on the property owner's criminal conduct.79 The Court
held that the Clause does apply to the civil forfeitures that were
imposed under the statutory provisions at issue in that case.' More
74. See id. at 260, 262-76. In Browning-Ferris, the jury found Browning-Ferris liable
for federal antitrust and state tort law violations resulting from Browning-Ferris's efforts
to drive the plaintiff, Kelco, out of business. See id. at 260-61. The jury awarded Kelco
$51,146 in compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages. See id. at 262.
Browning-Ferris appealed, claiming that the punitive damages were so excessive as to
violate the Eighth Amendment. See id.
75. 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
76. See id. at 558.
77. Id. In Alexander, the defendant was convicted of multiple violations of the
obscenity laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. See id. at
547. The district court imposed a six-year prison term and a $100,000 fine. See id. at 548.
In addition, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988), the district court ordered the defendant
to forfeit the assets that he had acquired as a result of his racketeering activities, including
his businesses and almost $9 million. See Alexander, 509 U.S. at 548. The defendant
argued that the forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. See
id. at 549. After deciding that the Excessive Fines Clause applied, the Supreme Court
remanded the case to the court of appeals for determination of whether the particular
forfeiture at issue was constitutionally excessive. See id. at 559.
78. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
79. See id. at 606. As Justice Scalia has explained, civil in rem forfeitures differ from
criminal in personam forfeitures in that "[tihe latter are assessments, whether monetary or
in kind, to punish the property owner's criminal conduct, while the former are
confiscations of property rights based on improper use of the property, regardless of
whether the owner has violated the law." Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
80. See id. at 604, 611-22. In Austin, the defendant pled guilty in state court to drug
charges and was sentenced to a prison term of seven years. See id. at 604. One month
later, the United States instituted a civil forfeiture action, seeking forfeiture of the
defendant's mobile home and automobile body shop. See id. The United States acted
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) (1988), which provided for forfeiture of
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generally, the Court also made clear that the Clause is not limited to
criminal sanctions, but that it also applies to civil sanctions that
contain a punitive component. 1
In its most recent case concerning the Excessive Fines Clause,
United States v. Ursery, the Court had occasion to address how
punitive a civil sanction must be in order to come within the purview
of the Clause. Although the question in Ursery was whether the civil
sanctions at issue constituted punishment for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the Court took pains to note that the level of
punishment necessary to trigger the Excessive Fines Clause is lower
than that necessary to invoke double jeopardy.8
In the course of these decisions, the Court gave shape and
content to the Excessive Fines Clause. First and foremost, the Court
emphasized that the purpose of the Clause is to limit the
government's power to punish.4 Relying on the historical roots of the
Clause, the Court explained: "[B]oth the Eighth Amendment and
§ 10 of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which it derives, were
intended to prevent the government from abusing its power to
punish."'  Indeed, the Court elaborated that the Amendment's
purpose, "putting the Bail Clause to one side, was to limit the
conveyances or real property that are used to facilitate the commission of a violation of
the drug laws. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 604-05 & n.1. The United States prevailed, and the
defendant challenged the forfeiture on Eighth Amendment grounds. See id. at 605-06. As
in Alexander, the Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case to the court of appeals for
determination of whether the particular forfeiture at issue was constitutionally excessive.
See id. at 622-23.
81. See id. at 610.
82. 116 S. Ct. 2135,2147(1996).
83. See id. In Ursery, defendant Ursery was caught growing marijuana in his house.
See id. at 2138. The United States instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against the house,
and Ursery ultimately settled the claim for $13,250. See id. at 2138-39. Ursery was then
indicted for manufacturing marijuana; he was convicted and sentenced to 63 months in
prison. See id. at 2139. Ursery challenged the conviction, claiming that it violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. The Supreme Court held that, although the civil
forfeiture provision at issue constituted punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines
Clause, it was not sufficiently punitive to constitute punishment for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 2147.
84. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 609-10. The Court stated in Browning-Ferris:
We think it clear, from both the language of the Excessive Fines Clause and the
nature of our constitutional framework, that the Eighth Amendment places
limits on the steps a government may take against an individual, whether it be
keeping him in prison, imposing excessive monetary sanctions, or using cruel and
unusual punishments.
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,275 (1989).
85. Austin, 509 U.S. at 607 (citing Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 266-67).
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government's power to punish."6 The Court described the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause as "self-evidently concerned with
punishment" and the Excessive Fines Clause as "limit[ing] the
Government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind,
'as punishment for some offense.' "
In Browning-Ferris, the Court focused on the importance of
governmental involvement, stressing that the Excessive Fines Clause
was "intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and
payable to, the government."'  The Court thus declined to apply the
Clause to awards of punitive damages that are payable solely to
private parties. 9
In Alexander, the Court confirmed that the Clause is broad
enough to apply to criminal forfeitures and is not limited merely to
cash fines.' ° The Court emphasized that "[t]he in personam criminal
forfeiture at issue here is clearly a form of monetary punishment no
different, for Eighth Amendment purposes, from a traditional
'fine.' ,,91
The Court then went significantly further in Austin, holding that
the Excessive Fines Clause also applies to civil sanctions that are
punitive in nature.' In Browning-Ferris, the Court had seemed on
the verge of limiting the Clause to criminal fines.' But the Court
dispelled any such notion in Austin, holding that the application of
the Excessive Fines Clause is not determined by whether the fine is
86. Id. at 609.
87. Id. at 609-10 (alteration in original) (quoting Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265).
88. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 268.
89. See id. at 275. In Browning-Ferris, the Court left open the questions of whether
the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the States and whether it protects corporations as
well as individuals. See id. at 276 n.22. Although these remain open questions, it seems
inevitable that the Court will answer both in the affirmative. As Justice O'Connor noted
in her separate opinion in Browning-Ferris, "the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
has been regularly applied to the States," and "the Court has assumed that the Excessive
Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to the States," and there is no apparent
reason "to distinguish one Clause of the Eighth Amendment from another for purposes of
incorporation." Id. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
cases). Furthermore, "[i]f a corporation is protected by the Due Process Clause from
overbearing and oppressive monetary sanctions," it seems quite likely that "it is also
protected from such penalties by the Excessive Fines Clause." Id. at 285 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544,558-59 (1993).
91. Id.
92- See Austin, 509 U.S. at 621-22.
93. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 263. Further, the Court had previously suggested
that the entire Eighth Amendment applies only in criminal cases. See Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 664-68 (1977).
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criminal or civil, but rather by whether the fine is judged to constitute
punishment.
Thus, in situations in which the government imposes and receives
the fine, the critical question is whether the fine should be regarded
as punitive in nature. On that point, the Court in Austin was careful
to emphasize that sanctions-whether imposed in civil or criminal
proceedings-often advance both punitive and remedial goals. 95 But
as long as a sanction-again, whether civil or criminal-has a punitive
component, it qualifies as punishment for purposes of the Excessive
Fines Clause." In the Court's words:
We need not exclude the possibility that a [sanction] serves
remedial purposes to conclude that it is subject to the
limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We, however,
must determine that it can only be explained as serving in
part to punish. We said in Halper that "a civil sanction that
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have
come to understand the term."'
Moreover, the Court held that, in determining whether a civil
sanction is punitive for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause, courts
should take a categorical approach, examining the sanction generally
rather than limiting their consideration to how the sanction was
applied in an individual case.9 Thus, for instance, in Austin itself the
Court focused on whether the relevant federal civil forfeiture
provisions, taken as a whole, were punitive to some degree, rather
than on whether they were punitive as applied to the defendant in
that particular case.' Three years later, in Ursery, the Court
reiterated that it takes a "categorical approach" when determining
whether a civil sanction is punitive for purposes of the Excessive
Fines Clause.1"
Perhaps more importantly, the Court in Ursery also shed further
light on the degree of punitiveness required for a civil sanction to
94. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.
95. See id.
96. See ia
97. IL- (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)); see also id. at 621
(reiterating this same point).
98. See id. at 622 n.14.
99. See id. at 619-22. The forfeiture provisions at issue in Austin were 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) (1988). See Austin, 509 U.S. at 604-05.
100. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135,2146-47 (1996).
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come within the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause. In Ursery, the
issue was whether civil forfeitures constitute punishment for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.' Two
circuit courts of appeals had held that civil forfeitures do constitute
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause, relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Austin, which had held that the same
federal civil forfeiture provision constituted punishment for purposes
of the Excessive Fines Clause."~ Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
reversed. In doing so, it clarified that the threshold at which a
sanction constitutes punishment is lower for purposes of the Excessive
Fines Clause than it is for the Double Jeopardy Clause:
Forfeitures effected under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)
are subject to review for excessiveness under the Eighth
Amendment after Austin; this does not mean, however, that
those forfeitures are so punitive as to constitute punishment
for the purposes of double jeopardy. The holding of Austin
was limited to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, and we decline to import the analysis of Austin
into our double jeopardy jurisprudence."°'
Because the Supreme Court employs a categorical approach in
determining whether a sanction is punitive for purposes of the
Excessive Fines Clause, it performs its analysis of whether a given
sanction violates the Clause in two stages. In the first stage, the Court
considers whether the general type or category of sanction at issue is
at least in part punitive."4 To resolve this critical point, the Court
considers "whether, at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified,
[the sanction] was understood at least in part as punishment and
101. See id. at 2138. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONsT.
amend. V.
102. See United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568,573 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135
(1996); United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994),
rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). Ursery involved the precise civil forfeiture provision at issue
in Austin (21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)); $405,089.23 U.S. Currency involved two different civil
forfeiture provisions (18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1994) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994)).
103. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147. Also, in Austin itself, the Court emphasized that the
determination of whether a civil fine involves punishment for purposes of the Excessive
Fines Clause is entirely separate from the question of whether a nominally civil
proceeding is so punitive that it should be "reclassified" as criminal, so that all of the
criminal procedural safeguards apply. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 n.6 (distinguishing
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167, 184 (1963), and United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980), which articulated tests for determining when a civil proceeding
must be considered criminal).
104. See Austin, 590 U.S. at 610-11.
1998]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
whether [the sanction] should be so understood today."1' 5  If the
answer to that inquiry is affirmative, then the Court proceeds to the
second stage of the inquiry, considering whether the particular
sanction imposed is so large as to be" 'excessive.' ",,
Although the Court reaffirmed in Ursery that courts should use
this two-stage inquiry to determine whether a civil sanction violates
the Excessive Fines Clause,1 the Court strongly suggested in
Alexander that the first stage-determining whether the general
category of sanction is subject to the Clause-is unnecessary when the
sanction at issue is a personal fine imposed in a criminal proceeding.'m
In Alexander, the Court thus did not undertake that analysis, stating
instead: "Unlike Austin, this case involves in personam criminal
forfeiture not in rem civil forfeiture, so there was no threshold
question concerning the applicability of the Eighth Amendment."1°9
Based on this treatment of the issue, it appears that the Court may be
willing simply to assume that all criminal fines are sufficiently
punitive to come within the scope of the Eighth Amendment.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE TO CONTEMPT
SANCTIONS
With this background in mind, the Article now turns to the
question of whether fines that are imposed as contempt sanctions fall
within the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause. The Article first
considers the relatively straightforward issue of whether criminal
contempt fines are subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines
Clause. It then considers the much more difficult issue of whether
coercive civil contempt fines are also subject to the Clause."'
105. Id.
106. Id. at 622 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 46-48, Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602 (1993) (No. 92-6073)); see also Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (noting that, in an
Excessive Fines Clause case, it is unnecessary to inquire at the first stage whether the civil
sanction actually imposed in the case is excessive, because that inquiry is made at the
second stage). In Austin, the Court recognized that
it appears to make little practical difference whether the Excessive Fines Clause
applies to all forfeitures ... or only to those that cannot be characterized as
purely remedial. The Clause prohibits only the imposition of "excessive" fines,
and a fine that serves purely remedial purposes cannot be considered "excessive"
in any event.
Austin, 509 U.S. at 622 n.14.
107. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
108. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544,559 n.4 (1993).
109. Id.
110. It is clear that compensatory civil contempt, which is designed only to compensate
the plaintiff for any damages sustained as a result of the contemnor's violation of the
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A. Application to Criminal Contempt Fines
Over the past several decades, the lower courts have consistently
assumed that criminal contempt sanctions are subject to the
restrictions of the Eighth Amendment."' Although none of these
courts has provided any analysis of the issue, they have willingly
entertained claims that particular sanctions are so excessive as to
violate either the Excessive Fines Clause or the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. A number of commentators have also made this
same assumption, treating application of the Clauses almost as a
given.'
12
The Supreme Court, however, has never directly addressed the
issue. Although several individual Justices have opined that criminal
contempt sanctions are constrained by the Eighth Amendment,' a
majority of the Court has not so held. Whether criminal contempt
court's order, is not subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. There are two reasons for this
conclusion. First, damages awards in such cases are paid to the plaintiff, not the
government. Second, the awards in such cases are purely remedial. Under both
Browning-Ferris and Austin, therefore, such awards would not qualify for the protection
of the Excessive Fines Clause. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 606-11; Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,267-68 (1989).
111. A number of courts have assumed that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment applies to criminal contempt fines. See United States v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 663 (2d Cir. 1989); Madden v. Grain Elevator, Flour & Feed
Mill Workers, Local 418, 334 F.2d 1014, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1964). Also, many courts have
assumed that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment
applies to criminal contempt prison sentences. See United States v. Brown, 247 F.2d 332,
339 (2d Cir. 1957) ("[U]nless the punishment [for criminal contempt] offends the
prohibition of the Eighth Amendment by reason of its cruel and unusual nature we must
affirm the sentence imposed."), affd, 359 U.S. 41 (1959); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92,
96 (6th Cir. 1957); United States v. Thompson, 214 F.2d 545, 546 (2d Cir. 1954); United
States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 9 (8th Cir. 1951); Brown v. Lederer, 140 F.2d 136, 138-39 (7th
Cir. 1944).
112. See RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 265-66 (1963); Nancy J.
King, Proportioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive
Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 151 (1995).
113. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165,200 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applies to criminal contempt sanctions),
overruled in part by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Sacher v. United States, 343
U.S. 1, 19 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (same); United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258, 377-78 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("The law has fixed standards for
each [contempt] remedy[:] .... for punishment, what is not cruel and unusual or, in the
case of a fine, excessive within the Eighth Amendment's prohibition."). Although these
Justices were writing in dissent, their statements concerning the Eighth Amendment's
applicability to criminal contempt sanctions were not contradicted by the majority.
Moreover, the dissenting Justices in these cases were criticizing the majority position that
criminal contempt defendants were not entiled to a jury trial. Eventually, the Court came
around to the dissenters' view, holding that there is a right to a jury trial in criminal
contempt cases. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,195-210 (1968).
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fines are subject to the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause
is thus an open question.
It is quite possible, indeed even likely, that the Supreme Court
would approach this question as it approached the issue in
Alexander-treating the application of the Excessive Fines Clause as
beyond doubt. 4 This result seems likely because the criminal
contempt fine, like the in personam forfeiture in Alexander, is a direct
criminal sanction. In Alexander, that factor alone seemed to resolve
the "threshold question concerning the applicability of the Eighth
Amendment, ''15 and it would quite probably do so for criminal
contempt sanctions as well.
Nevertheless, this threshold inquiry-looking at whether the
criminal contempt sanction was historically understood at least in part
as punishment, and whether it should be so understood today-is
worthwhile for two reasons. First, although the Court has frequently
insisted that criminal contempt is " 'a crime in the ordinary sense,' ".1'.
it has at times said that contempt is sui generis, neither wholly
criminal nor wholly civil in nature."7  Second, a complete
understanding of why the Excessive Fines Clause does and should
apply to criminal contempt sanctions will further the analysis of the
more difficult question of whether the Clause applies to coercive civil
contempt fines.
1. The Historical Understanding of Criminal Contempt
The first step in this inquiry is a determination of whether
criminal contempt sanctions were understood at least in part as
punishment when the Eighth Amendment was ratified. Because the
Eighth Amendment was patterned on Article 10 of England's 1689
Declaration and Bill of Rights,118 it is useful to begin with the
114. See Alexander, 509 U.S. at 559 n.4; see also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying
text (discussing Alexander).
115. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 599 n.4.
116. International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826 (1994)
(quoting Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201); see also United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993)
(quoting this same language from Bloom).
117. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966); Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932); United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1928); Myers v.
United States, 264 U.S. 95,103-05 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418, 441 (1911); see also GOLDFARB, supra note 112, at 62 (noting that the Court has
sometimes referred to contempt as sui generis); Dudley, supra note 14, at 1040, 1048-49,
1068 (same).




treatment of contempt in English law.
The notion of contempt of court dates back at least to the twelfth
century, and contempt was punished as an offense against the King by
the thirteenth century.119 The law of contempt was originally divided
into two categories: criminal contempt and contempt in procedure,
which was also known as civil contempt. 0 In these earlier times,
contempts were classified based on the type of behavior at issue. A
contempt was criminal if it involved words or acts that obstructed the
administration of justice, such as disruptive acts in the courtroom or
publishing libelous statements about a judge. 2' A contempt was a
contempt in procedure, on the other hand, if it involved disobedience
to the orders or processes of the court."
Although this historical division between forms of contempt
looks, at first impression, something like the division that is used
today, the categories themselves are fundamentally different. This
discontinuity stems from the fact that an entirely different principle is
now used to classify contempts.
While the classification of a contempt as criminal or civil
originally turned on the nature of the underlying behavior, today it
depends on the purpose of the sanction that is used to punish the
contempt.ln Thus, for instance, under the older classification scheme,
119. See JOHN C. FOX, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 45-46, 122-23 (1927)
[hereinafter FOX, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT].
120. See id. at 1; GOLDFARB, supra note 112, at 50; 7 HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 280 (1909).
121. See Fox, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT, supra note 119, at 1; 7 HALSBURY, supra note
120, at 280-94 (listing and describing acts that would constitute criminal contempt).
122. See Fox, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT, supra note 119, at 1; 7 HALSBURY, supra note
120, at 280, 297-306 (listing and describing acts that would constitute contempt in
procedure). Ronald Goldfarb contends that contempt in procedure "was considered a
quasi-contempt; contempt in theory and name alone." GOLDFARB, supra note 112, at 50.
Thus, he argues, "there was not, as is now the case, a body of law dubbed contempt, but
divided into two separate parts--civil and criminal. Rather, there was a body of contempt
law, and a distinct procedural device, like contempt, called contempt, but not really
contempt." Id. at 51.
Also, it should be noted that the nomenclature was not always consistent. In the
Encyclopedia of the Laws of England, the same basic distinction set out in the text is
drawn between the two forms of contempt, but the author has denominated the categories
"direct" contempt (rather than criminal contempt) and "indirect" contempt (rather than
contempt in procedure). 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 502 (2d ed. 1907)
[hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS].
123. See International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827-28
(1994); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1988); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); see also Dudley, supra note 14, at 1035 (stating that the
Supreme Court's distinction between criminal and civil contempt was "embryonic" in
1887); supra notes 5-24 and accompanying text (discussing the modem distinction between
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a defendant's disobedience of a court order would be treated as a civil
contempt, because that was the type of act that fell within the civil
contempt category. Today, in contrast, a defendant's disobedience of
a court order could be treated as either a criminal contempt or a civil
contempt, depending on whether the court's sanction is designed to
punish the past disobedience (in which case the contempt would be
criminal), to coerce the defendant's compliance in the future (in
which case the contempt would be coercive civil), or to compensate
the plaintiff for harm caused by the defendant's disobedience (in
which case the contempt would be compensatory civil).124
In consequence, it is risky to draw any conclusions about the
treatment of modem-day contempt sanctions based on the treatment
or understanding of contempt sanctions in centuries past. Indeed,
Ronald Goldfarb contends that, in this area,
all that can be gleaned from the past is that the legal rules
supporting both civil and criminal contempts have been
liquefied to the point where one often washes into the other.
Today, civil and criminal contempts combine to form the law
of contempt, though historically one was a contempt power,
and the other was a procedure for civil execution,
unfortunately and confusingly labeled, and having certain
similar characteristics as "true" contempts.125
Although the reach of the criminal contempt category has thus
expanded under the modem distinction between criminal and civil
contempt, much of what was originally considered to be criminal
civil and criminal contempt).
124. See generally GOLDFARB, supra note 112, at 51 ("Today, the law of contempt
embodies both civil and criminal contempt, and though both were born from different
history and reason, they are considered but nuances of each other and are often applied
interchangeably. Civil contempts are now often treated in ways which are
extraordinary .... ).
Various other aspects of ancient contempt procedure strongly suggest that the
traditional categories of criminal and civil contempt bore little resemblance to the
categories that are in use today. For instance, it appears that in older times, prison
sentences for criminal, as well as civil, contempt could be indefinite in length. See
7 HALSBURY, supra note 120, at 316 & note n; John C. Fox, The Practice in Contempt of
Court Cases, 38 L.Q. REV. 185, 200 (1922) [hereinafter Fox, Practice in Contempt Cases].
Today, a fixed and definite prison sentence is one of the hallmarks of criminal contempt.
See, e.g., Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828-29. Further, although the authorities are not clear on
this point, it seems that criminal contempt sanctions, as well as civil contempt sanctions,
could (at least in some cases) be purged. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS, supra note 122,
at 504-05; 7 HALSBURY, supra note 120, at 282. Today, in contrast, the ability to purge
the contempt sanction by complying with the court's order is limited to coercive civil
contempt. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828.
125. GOLDFARB, supra note 112, at 66.
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contempt remains so today. As Sir John Fox, who painstakingly
detailed the history of contempt, has summarized: "Acts of criminal
contempt in that age [the fourteenth century] are criminal contempt
to-day."'1 ' Further, because the modem distinction turns on the
purpose of the contempt sanction, the forms of contempt more
recently placed in the category of criminal contempts are, by
definition, directly related in purpose to the traditional forms that
have remained in this category. For these reasons, despite the
extensive evolution that has occurred in contempt law, some parallels
can be drawn between the historical and modem treatment of
contempt, particularly with respect to criminal contempt.
Historically, the criminal contempt sanction was understood to
be punishment. As Sir John Fox explained:
[F]rom the earliest laws of the kingdom, through the records
of the Curia Regis and the Parliament, the Year Books and
the first treatises on law, the development of "contempt" in
the legal sense can be traced until by the fourteenth century
the principles upon which punishment is inflicted to restrain
disobedience to the commands of the King and his courts as
well as other acts which tend to obstruct the course of
justice, have become firmly established."z
This ancient understanding of contempt sanctions as punishment
continued as the law of contempt developed through the seventeenth
century and beyond.'2 Indeed, it seems clear that contempt sanctions
were not only understood as punishment, but also were subject to the
restrictions of Magna Carta, and eventually the English Declaration
and Bill of Rights of 1689.29
Prior to the seventeenth century, courts punished contempts in
one of two ways: they either amerced the offender or imposed a
126. John C. Fox, The Nature of Contempt of Court, 37 L.Q. REV. 191, 201 (1921)
[hereinafter Fox, Nature of Contempt].
127. Id. (emphasis added); see also FOX, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT, supra note 119, at
47-49 (discussing the practice of punishing for contempt); GOLDFARB, supra note 112, at
13-14 (noting that the criminal contempt sanction was historically considered
punishment).
128. See 1 EDWARD COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 126 (facsimile ed. 1979) (1628) ("[Fine signifieth a pecuniarie punishment for
an offence or a contempt committed against the King .... "); Fox, HISTORY OF
CONTEMPT, supra note 119, at 200 (repeatedly referring to the sanction for criminal
contempt as "punishment"); 7 HALSBURY, supra note 120, at 280 ("Criminal contempt is
a misdemeanour punishable by fine or imprisonment, or by order to give security for good
behaviour.").
129. See supra notes 59-70 (discussing the Amendment's origins in these English
documents).
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sentence of imprisonment. An amercement was a monetary penalty,
paid to the Crown, which was set by a jury of the offender's peers
once his guilt was established."3 Amercements were very common,
not only for contempts,"3 but also for a wide variety of other
offenses.ln Because amercements were so prevalent, and the power
to amerce so easily abused, three chapters of Magna Carta were
devoted to regulating and restricting the amercement power.'3 These
chapters, which eventually formed the basis for the Excessive Fines
Clause in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, required that
amercements be proportional to the degree of the offense."M
Monetary penalties for contempt offenses, in the form of
amercements, were subject to these limitations in Magna Carta.
The second form of punishment available for contempt was
imprisonment. Prior to the seventeenth century, imprisonment could
always be avoided by "making fine," that is, by paying to the Crown a
sum of money in lieu of going to prison.35 In theory, the fine was a
bargain made between the offender and the court; it was not imposed
by the court (indeed, at that time, judges had no power to impose
fines), but rather it was negotiated by the offender to bring an end to
the matter.'3
130. See generally 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 513-15 (describing
amercements in general and the procedure for their imposition in particular); Massey,
supra note 57, at 1252-53 (defining and describing amercements).
131. See Fox, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT, supra note 119, at 118-19 (providing examples
of contemptuous behavior that could lead to amercement).
132. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 513 ("In the thirteenth century
amercements are being inflicted right and left .... [M]ost men in England must have
expected to be amerced at least once a year."); id. at 519 (noting that a "litigant who
hoped to get to the end of his suit without an amercement must have been a sanguine
man").
133. See MCKECHNIE, supra note 64, at 284-99 (describing and discussing chapters 20-
22 of Magna Carta, which address amercements against freemen, merchants, and villeins;
earls and barons; and the clergy). A fourth chapter, chapter 55, of Magna Carta also dealt
with amercements, by providing for restitution of fines and amercements unjustly
imposed. See id. at 454-56.
134. For instance, chapter 20 provided in part: "'A freeman shall not be amerced for a
slight offence, except in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a grave offence
he shall be amerced in accordance with the gravity of the offence, yet saving always his
"contenement."' " MCKECHNIE, supra note 64, at 284 (quoting MAGNA CARTA, ch. 20).
"[] save a man's 'contenement' was to leave him sufficient for the sustenance of himself
and those dependent on him." Id. at 293.
135. See FOX, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT, supra note 119, at 119; 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 517.
136. See FOX, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT, supra note 119, at 119, 121 (describing the
process of "making fine"); MCKECHNIE, supra note 64, at 293 (same); 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 64, at 517-18 (same). As Professor William McKechnie notes,
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Although the two punishment alternatives-amercement or
imprisonment with the option to make fine-were originally quite
distinct, the two began to meld over time. By the beginning of the
seventeenth century, "the 'making fine for contempt' was
disappearing," and the courts were beginning to impose fines on their
own authority, in the modem sense." When the Declaration and Bill
of Rights were adopted in 1689, therefore, Article 10's prohibition
against "excessive fines" was understood to reaffirm the ancient right
against excessive amercements in Magna Carta, as well as to prohibit
the imposition of excessive fines by the courts.1"
History thus strongly indicates that monetary sanctions for
criminal contempt, whether in the form of an amercement or a court-
imposed fine, were subject to the limitations of the excessive fines
clause in Article 10 of the 1689 Declaration and Bill of Rights. As
noted above, the Eighth Amendment was intended to provide for
Americans the same protections that were secured for the English
people by Article 10.' It therefore seems clear that criminal
contempt sanctions were understood to be punishment, and thus they
would have been considered to be subject to the Excessive Fines
Clause at the time that the Eighth Amendment was ratified.
2. Criminal Contempt as Punishment Today
The original understanding of criminal contempt fines as
punishment continues today. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly described the purpose of the criminal contempt sanction
however, the notion of the "voluntary" fine was often a fiction: "The Crown might
imprison its victims for an indefinite period, and then graciously allow them to offer large
payments to escape death by fever or starvation in some noisome gaol." MCKECHNIE,
supra note 64, at 293.
137. Fox, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT, supra note 119, at 177; see also MCKECHNIE,
supra note 64, at 293 ("With the gradual elimination of the voluntary element the word
'fine' came to bear its modem meaning, while 'amercement' dropped out of ordinary
use."); ADAM SMITH, LECrURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 303, 431 (R.L. Meek et al. eds.,
1978) (noting that, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, contempt was punished by
imprisonment or fine).
138. See SCHWOERER, supra note 61, at 90-92 (explaining that the excessive fines
clause in the Declaration of Rights applied to fines and amercements); Massey, supra note
57, at 1256 ("Article ten explicitly addressed the issue of fines, while it implicitly
reaffirmed ancient rights with respect to amercements. The Declaration of Rights'
excessive fines clause thus should be read as simultaneously prohibiting excessive fines
and amercements, whether imposed by judge or jury, in both civil and criminal
proceedings."); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1983) ("An amercement
was similar to a modem-day fine. It was the most common criminal sanction in 13th
century England.").
139. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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as punitive. In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,1 o the leading
case on the distinction among the three forms of contempt, the Court
flatly stated that the sanction for criminal contempt operates "solely
as punishment for the completed act of disobedience.. 41 The Court
has consistently adhered to this view over the ensuing years,
reiterating that "[s]entences for criminal contempt are punitive in
their nature and are imposed for the purpose of vindicating the
authority of the court."142
This understanding of the purpose of criminal contempt
sanctions has led the Court to describe criminal contempt as "a crime
in every fundamental respect," 143 and to extend to criminal contempt
defendants virtually all of the constitutional protections provided to
defendants in other types of criminal cases.1" It thus seems inevitable
that the Court will also extend the protections of the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause to criminal contempt
defendants. And this result is unquestionably correct, given the
historical record and the Court's explicit recognition of the punitive
nature of the criminal contempt sanction.
B. Application to Coercive Civil Contempt Fines
Whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to coercive civil
contempt is, however, a much more vexing problem. The courts have
always considered coercive contempt sanctions to be a civil (rather
140. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
141. Id. at 443. The Court also stated that where the sanction "is for criminal contempt
the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court." Id at 441.
142. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,302 (1947) (citing Gompers,
221 U.S. at 441); see also International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
821, 828 (1994) (stating that criminal contempt sanctions are punitive, for vindication of
the court's authority); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624,631-32 (1988) (same).
143. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968). The Court explained more fully:
"[Clonvictions for criminal contempt are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal
convictions, for their impact on the individual defendant is the same. Indeed, the role of
criminal contempt and that of many ordinary criminal laws seem identical-protection of
the institutions of our government and enforcement of their mandates." Id.; see also
Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826 (describing criminal contempt as a crime in the ordinary sense);
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (same).
144. See, e.g., Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696 (protection from double jeopardy); Bloom, 391
U.S. at 198 (right to a jury trial); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 (1948) (right to trial in
open court); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925) (notice of charges;
assistance of counsel; presentation of defense); Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444 (presumption of
innocence; proof beyond a reasonable doubt; right against self-incrimination). But see
Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 104 (1924) (holding that the normal provisions on
venue do not apply in contempt cases). See generally supra notes 29-33 and accompanying
text (discussing the procedural protections afforded to criminal contempt defendants).
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than a criminal) matter, because they serve a remedial purpose: to
gain compliance with the court's order. 45 As Austin made clear,
however, the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause is not
limited to criminal sanctions. Instead, the Clause applies to any
government-imposed sanction that constitutes punishment in some
respect, regardless of whether the sanction is characterized as "civil"
or "criminal."' 4
Fines imposed for violation of a coercive contempt order are
government-imposed sanctions. The fines are imposed by the court,
for continued violation of the court's order. And the fines are
payable to the court, not to the other litigants.4  Coercive fines thus
constitute "fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the
government,"' 48 and as such, meet the initial requirement for
application of the Excessive Fines Clause.
The more difficult question is whether coercive contempt
sanctions constitute punishment. The Court in Austin expressly
recognized that a sanction may be punitive, even though it also serves
remedial purposes.'49 Indeed, the Court emphasized that in order to
be considered punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause,
the sanction need only serve in part to punish.'m Thus, in order for
the Clause to apply to the coercive contempt sanction, a court "need
not exclude the possibility that [the sanction] serves remedial
purposes."'' Rather, the court must simply determine that the
coercive sanction "can only be explained as serving in part to
punish."' '
145. See, e.g., Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631-33; United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-04;
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441-42. The characterization of coercive contempt sanctions as civil
has, however, been roundly criticized. See Richard C. Brautigam, Constitutional
Challenges to the Contempt Power, 60 GEo. LJ. 1513, 1521-23 (1972); Dudley, supra note
14, at 1062-63.
146. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608-10 (1993); see also supra text
accompanying note 97 (quoting the relevant discussion in Austin).
147. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632; New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886
F.2d 1339, 1353-54 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Andrd, supra note 12, at 1051 n.66 (noting that
coercive fines are payable to the court).
148. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 268 (1989); see also
supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding in Browning-
Ferris).
149. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610, 621; see also supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's holding in Austin).
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1. The Historical Understanding of Coercive Contempt
To make the determination that the coercive sanction serves in
part to punish, it is necessary first to consider whether, at the time the
Eighth Amendment was ratified, coercive contempt sanctions were
understood at least in part as punishment. Again, because the Eighth
Amendment grew out of Article 10 of the 1689 Declaration and Bill
of Rights, the historical treatment of contempt in English law is the
starting point of this inquiry.
As discussed above, however, reliance on the historical treatment
of contempt is problematic, because of the fundamental change in the
principle by which contempts today are categorized as criminal or
civil."' Originally, contempts were not classified based on the
purpose of the sanction, as they are today, but rather on the nature of
the contemptuous conduct. If the conduct disrupted or hindered the
administration of justice, it was characterized as a criminal contempt.
If, on the other hand, the conduct involved disobedience to a court
order, it was classified as a civil contempt (also known as a contempt
in procedure).1- As a result, the varieties of contempt falling within
the civil contempt category were substantially different than they are
today.
In addition, the nature of the sanction imposed for civil contempt
has changed significantly over the centuries. Originally, under
English law, a court could punish a civil contempt either by
amercement or imprisonment. 5 According to Sir John Fox, however,
the court could not impose a fine.' 5' Today, of course, the courts
routinely impose fines in contempt cases. To some extent, this power
is analogous to the amercement power, the primary difference being
that the judge, rather than the jury, sets the amount of the fine. But
in the case of civil coercive contempt, it appears that the current use
of the fine as a conditional penalty designed to coerce compliance is a
modem novelty.
Looking at whether, historically, civil contempt sanctions were
understood in part as punishment thus does little to advance the
effort to ascertain the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause, because
153. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (discussing the change in the
principle by which contempts are categorized).
154. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional method
for classifying contempts).
155. See Fox, Practice in Contempt Cases, supra note 124, at 189, 198.
156. See id. at 198.
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civil contempt has changed so substantially over time.1" However, to
the extent that the historical understanding of civil contempt
sanctions is relevant at all, it appears that sanctions for civil contempt
were considered to be punishment, at least in part.
With respect to civil contempts that involved disobedience to a
court order, the sanction imposed was historically understood to have
both a remedial and a punitive purpose. As Lord Halsbury explained:
In circumstances involving misconduct, contempt in
procedure partakes to some extent of a criminal nature, and
then bears a two-fold character, implying as between the
parties to the proceedings merely a right to exercise and a
liability to submit to a form of civil execution, but as
between the party in default and the State, a penal or
disciplinary jurisdiction, to be exercised by the court in the
public interest. . Misconduct of this kind consists in
disobedience to ... orders for the payment of money... , or
in wilful disobedience to any order or process, or in the
breach of an undertaking given to the court."'
Not surprisingly, therefore, in discussions of civil contempt, the
sanctions imposed are regularly referred to as "punishment." For
example, Lord Halsbury stated that "[w]ilful disobedience to a
judgment or order requiring a person to do any act other than the
payment of money, or to abstain from doing anything, is a contempt
of court punishable by attachment or committal." ''
In addition, one of the sanctions for contempts in procedure (or
civil contempts) was amercement" Magna Carta provided specific
protections against abusive use of the amercement power.161 These
157. Justice Kennedy has cautioned against relying on outmoded historical practice:
"In recounting the law's history, we risk anachronism if we attribute to an earlier time an
intent to employ legal concepts that had not yet evolved." Austin, 509 U.S. at 628-29
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
158. 7 HALSBURY, supra note 120, at 297-98 (footnotes omitted); see also GOLDFARB,
supra note 112, at 50-51 (explaining that civil contempt was understood to have both
remedial and punitive purposes); Fox, Nature of Contempt, supra note 126, at 201 (same).
159. 7 HALSBURY, supra note 120, at 302 (emphasis added); see also Fox, Practice in
Contempt Cases, supra note 124, at 189 ("The procedure to punish [contempt in
procedure] is a form of civil execution." (emphasis added)); id. at 198 ("Contempt in
procedure is punishable by imprisonment, and not by fine." (emphasis added)).
160. See 2 POLLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 64, at 519 ("Every mistake in pleading
... brought an amercement on the pleader if the mistake was to be retrieved."); Fox,
Practice in Contempt Cases, supra note 124, at 189 ("In early days the practice was more
strict than at present, and a suitor who made a slip in procedure was considered guilty of
contempt and amerced.").
161. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (describing amercements and
Magna Carta's regulation of the amercement power).
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protections were implicitly reaffirmed in the Excessive Fines Clause
of the English Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689 and were
eventually carried forward into the Eighth Amendment.' As a
result, this traditional practice tends to confirm that civil contempt
sanctions were historically understood to be punishment.
To the extent that the historical understanding of civil contempt
sanctions can be relied on, therefore, it appears that such sanctions
were considered to be punishment. Ronald Goldfarb supports this
view, stating that "[r]eference again to the historical nature of the
contempt power indicates that in any event, contempt of any kind or
classification could historically only be a governmental power to be
used essentially for governmental purposes, any private aspects
notwithstanding. This is incontrovertible fact and history.''
2. Coercive Contempt as Punishment Today
In light of the ambiguity in the historical understanding of the
nature of coercive contempt (at least in its modern form), a more
significant inquiry for purposes of determining the applicability of the
Excessive Fines Clause is whether coercive contempt sanctions as
they are employed today are punishment. That inquiry requires a
functional analysis of the purposes of such sanctions.
The courts have long said that the principal purpose of coercive
contempt sanctions is remedial.'" Coercive sanctions are remedial in
the sense that the threat of the sanction serves to coerce the
recalcitrant contempt defendant into complying with the court's
order. When the court announces that it will imprison or fine a
defendant unless or until the defendant abides by the court's order,
the court is using the announced sanction as a lever to force the
defendant to comply. That effort benefits the plaintiff to the extent
that the threat of contempt sanctions achieves more immediate
compliance with the court's order.1 6' Once the defendant is coerced
into compliance, the continuing wrong is abated, and thereby
162. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of
Magna Carta's protection against excessive amercements in the Declaration of Rights and
eventually the Eighth Amendment).
163. GOLDFARB, supra note 112, at 58.
164. See supra note 13 (citing cases).
165. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 636 (1988) (citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,443 (1911)) (noting that the plaintiff benefits when the contempt
sanction modifies the defendant's disobedient behavior); Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442
(explaining that the coercive sanction "is intended to coerce the defendant to do the thing




The method that the courts have adopted to coerce that
compliance is, however, unavoidably punitive. The tool by which the
courts coerce compliance is the threat of punishment. The sanctions
that result from an unheeded coercive order are thus punitive: they
are the punishment that was threatened for noncompliance. The
coercive contempt sanction is therefore at least in part punishment;
although it serves a remedial purpose in that it helps to coerce
compliance, the sanction also serves a punitive purpose because it is
through the punishment implicit in the threatened sanction that the
coercion is achieved. 16
a. The Punitive Component of Coercive Contempt Sanctions
The Supreme Court has recognized this important punitive
aspect of the coercive contempt sanction, acknowledging on a number
of occasions that coercive contempt sanctions involve punishment:
In contempt cases, both civil and criminal relief have aspects
that can be seen as either remedial or punitive or both:
when a court imposes fines and punishments on a
contemnor, it is not only vindicating its legal authority to
enter the initial court order, but it also is seeking to give
effect to the law's purpose of modifying the contemnor's
behavior to conform to the terms required in the order.1 67
166. On the punitive nature of coercive contempt sanctions, Professor Richard
Brautigam persuasively argues:
Although civil contempt has been praised as the least drastic power adequate to
compel obedience, such a view underestimates the essentially punitive nature of
civil contempt. Unless monetary damages would fail to provide adequate
compensation for disobedience, the only justification for attempting to coerce
specific action through civil contempt is to punish the contemnor for his
disobedience.
Brautigam, supra note 145, at 1521 (footnotes omitted); see also GOLDFARB, supra note
112, at 57 ("In civil contempt cases, though the rationale may be assistance to a private
party litigant in the execution of his civil remedies, there is an exaltation of government
and a strengthening of its control and power through the judicial process."); Hostak, supra
note 24, at 195 ("[C]oercive fines and imprisonment have a distinctly criminal cast."). But
see Beale, supra note 28, at 173 (describing coercive contempt as "purely coercive, not
punitive"); Comment, The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 33 U. Ci. L. REv. 120,
127 (1965) ("When coercive imprisonment is applied only to enforce rights due others and
is the sole means of enforcing those rights, it is being used for purely nonpunitive
purposes.").
167. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 635; see also International Union, United Mine Workers v.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994) ("Most contempt sanctions, like most criminal
punishments, to some extent punish a prior offense as well as coerce an offender's future
obedience."); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1966) (noting that courts
"often speak in terms of criminal contempt and punishment for remedial purposes," and
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Indeed, when the Court laid out the distinction between civil and
criminal contempt in Gompers, it was even more blunt about the
essentially punitive nature of the coercive sanction: "It is not the fact
of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to
distinguish between the two classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt
the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. '
This understanding of coercive contempt as containing a punitive
component is fully consistent with the Court's notion of punishment.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "punishment serves the
twin aims of retribution and deterrence."'69 Moreover, the Court has
made clear that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to
serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we
have come to understand the term."'"7
In contempt cases, the Supreme Court has regularly reiterated
that criminal contempt sanctions are punitive because they are
designed to vindicate the court's authority.' When a sanction is
designed to vindicate the court's authority, the sanction serves the
traditional goals of punishment. The sanction serves the retributive
goal in that it imposes a negative consequence on the contemnor for
flouting the court's authority. The sanction also serves the deterrent
goal in that it discourages both the particular contemnor before the
court and future litigants in general from disobeying court orders.
Both of these effects strengthen not only the orders of the court, but
the authority of the court itself.'"
acknowledging that "any imprisonment, of course, has punitive and deterrent effects," but
opining that it nonetheless "must be viewed as remedial if the court conditions release
upon the contemnor's willingness to testify"); Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 221 (1932)
(noting the overlap between civil and criminal contempt).
168. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added).
169. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,448 (1989); see also Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (referring to retribution and deterrence as the goals of
punishment); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979) (same); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (same); King, supra note 112, at 164 (describing
retribution and deterrence as "the two quintessential goals of criminal punishment").
170. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448; see also Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (quoting this same
language from Halper).
171. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828 (stating that a sentence for criminal contempt is
punitive, to vindicate the court's authority); Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631 (same); United States
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302 (1947) ("Sentences for criminal contempt are
punitive in their nature and are imposed for the purpose of vindicating the authority of the
court."); Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441 ("[I]f [the sanction] is for criminal contempt the
sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.").
172. In Bloom v. Illinois, the Court made the point somewhat differently: "Indeed, the
role of criminal contempt and that of many ordinary criminal laws seem identical-
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Use of the contempt sanction to vindicate the court's authority,
however, is not limited to criminal contempt cases. Vindication of the
court's authority is also an important function of coercive civil
contempt sanctions. As the Court recognized in Hicks, in coercive
civil contempt cases, the court's imposition of a fine serves to
"vindicat[e] its legal authority to enter the initial court order," as well
as serving to modify the contemnor's behavior. '73 Indeed, the Court
originally acknowledged this point in Gompers, stating that "[ilt is
true that either form of imprisonment has also an incidental effect.
For if the case is civil and the punishment is purely remedial, there is
also a vindication of the court's authority."1 74
Contrary to the Court's suggestion in Gompers, however, it has
become clear that vindication of the court's authority is more than a
mere incidental by-product of the coercive contempt sanction. The
importance of this aspect of the coercive sanction is perhaps best
demonstrated by the reaction of the courts to settlement-based
requests for vacatur of such sanctions.
Because coercive contempt fines can be so significant, the parties
in a number of cases have sought to diminish or eliminate the fines
through provisions in their settlement agreements. 75 In these cases,
the parties have argued that the courts are obliged to vacate the fines,
either on the ground that settlement of the action mooted the case or
as a matter of policy.76 The courts that have addressed the issue,
however, have uniformly concluded that they have no obligation to
protection of the institutions of our government and enforcement of their mandates." 391
U.S. 194,201 (1968).
173. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 635; see also Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828 (quoting this same
language from Hicks).
174. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443. The Court, however, emphasized that "such indirect
consequences will not change imprisonment which is merely coercive and remedial, into
that which is solely punitive in character, or vice versa." Il at 443; see also Shillitani v.
United States, 384 U.S. 364,370 (1966) ("While any imprisonment, of course, has punitive
and deterrent effects, it must be viewed as remedial if the court conditions release upon
the contemnor's willingness to [comply] .... The test may be stated as: what does the
court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing sentence?").
175. See United States v. Work Wear Corp., 602 F.2d 110, 114 (6th Cir. 1979); Clark v.
United Mine Workers, 752 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (W.D. Va. 1990); In re Rogers Oil Co., 17
B.R. 319,321 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1982); Hawaii Pub. Employment Relations Bd. v. United
Pub. Workers, Local 646, 667 P.2d 783, 797 (Haw. 1983); Labor Relations Comm'n v. Fall
River Educators' Ass'n, 416 N.E.2d 1340, 1349 (Mass. 1981); Bagwell v. United Mine
Workers, 423 S.E.2d 349, 358 (Va. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
176. See generally Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the
Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.. 9, 61-73 (1996) (describing and discussing the vacatur
issue).
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reduce or vacate the coercive fines.1" In reaching this conclusion, the
courts have relied explicitly on the need to vindicate their authority
through the coercive contempt sanction:
Courts of the Commonwealth must have the authority to
enforce their orders by employing coercive, civil sanctions if
the dignity of the law and public respect for the judiciary are
to be maintained. If we were to adopt the [defendant's]
mootness contention, any organization which faced coercive,
contempt fines would know that, in order to completely
avoid payment of the fines, it only had to postpone actual
collection of the fines until the settlement of the underlying
litigation."
The courts' unwillingness to allow parties to settle away coercive
contempt sanctions confirms that vindication of the court's authority
is a vital component of the coercive contempt sanction.' 79 The
177. See supra note 175 (citing cases).
178. Bagwell, 423 S.E.2d at 358; see also Work Wear, 602 F.2d at 114 & n.12 (noting
that the trial court had refused to reduce the coercive fines on the ground that doing so
"would denigrate the authority of the Court and sanction mere lip service to its Orders");
Clark, 752 F. Supp. at 1301 ("[IThe court's adoption of the [defendant's] mootness
argument would absolutely undermine the efficacy of civil contempt sanctions.... No
decision of this court will allow such unanswered contempt toward the rule of law."); In re
Rogers Oil Co., 17 B.R. at 321 ("To empower the officers of the estate to compromise the
fines would mean that the judicial power might always be upset or overturned by
nonjudicial officers charged with administration of the estate."); Hawaii Pub. Employment
Relations Bd., 667 P.2d at 797 (reasoning that allowing agreed vacatur of coercive
contempt sanctions "could effectively defeat the coercive function of civil contempt
sanctions").
Several courts, however, have indicated that in some instances it is appropriate for
courts to exercise their discretion to reduce or vacate coercive contempt fines. See Work
Wear, 602 F.2d at 116; League of Voluntary Hosps. & Homes of N.Y. v. Local 1199, Drug
& Hosp. Union, 490 F.2d 1398, 1405 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973), vacated in part, No. 73
Civ. 4702, 1974 WL 1070 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 16,1974).
179. In International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, the United States
Supreme Court reviewed the Virginia Supreme Court's decision to treat the contempt
sanctions in that case as coercive civil sanctions. See 512 U.S. 821, 823 (1994). Although
the majority mentioned the vacatur issue only in describing the procedural history of the
case, see id. at 825-26, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, took pains to
note that "the Virginia courts' refusal to vacate the fines, despite the parties' settlement
and joint motion ... is characteristic of criminal, not civil, proceedings," id. at 847
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg was persuaded that the Virginia Supreme Court's rationale for collecting the
fines, which was that courts "'must have the authority to enforce their orders by
employing coercive, civil sanctions if the dignity of the law and public respect for the
judiciary are to be maintained,'" reflected purposes characteristic of criminal contempt.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Bagwell,




primary purpose of such sanctions may be remedial, but the courts'
insistence on enforcing the sanctions even against the parties' express
preference shows that vindication of the court's authority is also an
independent and integral function."
Although the Supreme Court has often acknowledged that
coercive contempt sanctions serve this function, 1 it has not been
consistent on the point. The Court has often shied away from
characterizing such sanctions as punitive, even denying outright that
they involve punishment. Indeed, the Court's inconsistency is
dramatically illustrated in Gompers itself: Four sentences after it
acknowledged that coercive contempt sanctions involve
punishment," the Court insisted that "[i]mprisonment in [coercive
contempt] cases is not inflicted as a punishment, but is intended to be
remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had refused todo.,,)183
b. The "Keys to the Prison" Rationale
In order to buttress this difficult contention that coercive
180. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 847 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("[W]ith the private complainant gone from the scene, and an official
appointed by the Commonwealth to collect the fines for the Commonwealth's coffers, it is
implausible to invoke the justification of benefiting the civil complainant.").
Parties, of course, also have no authority to settle away criminal contempt sanctions.
As the Court explained in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.:
If this had been a separate and independent proceeding at law for criminal
contempt, to vindicate the authority of the court, with the public on one side and
the defendants on the other, it could not, in any way, have been affected by any
settlement which the parties to the equity cause made in their private litigation.
221 U.S. 418, 451 (1991). On the other hand, the Court in Gompers emphasized that
parties may settle away compensatory civil contempt sanctions:
IT]his was a proceeding in equity for civil contempt where the only remedial
relief possible was a fine payable to the complainant.... [W]hen the main cause
was terminated by a settlement of all differences between the parties, the
complainant did not require and was not entitled to any compensation or relief
of any other character.
Id. at 451-52.
181. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
recognition of the punitive aspect of coercive contempt sanctions).
182. See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441. Specifically, the Court stated: "It is not the fact of
punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish between
the two classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the
benefit of the complainant." Id.
183. Id. at 442; see also Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828,831 (conceding that "[m]ost contempt
sanctions, like most criminal punishments, to some extent punish a prior offense as well as
coerce an offender's future obedience," but stating, nevertheless, that "civil contempt
sanctions are viewed as nonpunitive"); Hostak, supra note 24, at 200 (discussing the
Court's inconsistency on this point).
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contempt sanctions do not contain any punitive aspect, courts have
primarily relied on the argument that, because the defendant can
entirely avoid a coercive sanction simply by complying with the
court's order, any sanction imposed is not punishment. This
argument is captured in the quaint adage that a coercive contempt
defendant "carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket."'1
4
This "keys to the prison" argument has served as the Court's
main justification for treating coercive contempt sanctions as civil,
rather than criminal. It has thus led the Court, or at least enabled the
Court, to continue to deny coercive contempt defendants the basic
procedural safeguards, such as the right to trial by a jury, that are
constitutionally required for defendants in criminal contempt cases.
18
Indeed, the Court has used the "keys to the prison" rationale to
reject a coercive contempt defendant's argument that his sentence
violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. 6 In Uphaus v. Wyman," the trial court had ordered the
defendant confined until he produced subpoenaed documents." On
appeal, the defendant argued that the indefinite sentence constituted
cruel and unusual punishment!'" The Supreme Court, however,
brushed off that argument, stating:
"Before going any further, perhaps it should be emphasized
that we are not at all concerned with the power of courts to
impose conditional imprisonment for the purpose of
compelling a person to obey a valid order. Such coercion,
184. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442; see also Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828 (employing the "keys
to the prison" metaphor); Hicks, 485 U.S. at 633 (same); Shillitani v. United States, 384
U.S. 364, 368 (1966) (same); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947) (same). The
phrase originated in In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448,461 (8th Cir. 1902).
185. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831 ("Because civil contempt sanctions are viewed as
nonpunitive and avoidable, fewer procedural protections for such actions have been
required."); Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 370-71 ("The conditional nature of the imprisonment...
justifies holding civil contempt proceedings."); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 197
(1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (contending that a criminal contempt defendant should have
a right to a jury trial, but distinguishing coercive civil contempt on the ground that "[s]uch
coercion, where the defendant carries the keys to freedom in his willingness to comply
with the court's directive, is essentially a civil remedy"), overruled in part by Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
186. The Supreme Court has treated its cases involving the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause as "instructive," but not "controlling" in cases involving the
Excessive Fines Clause. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263
n.3 (1989); see also infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between these clauses of the Eighth Amendment).
187. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
188. See id. at 75.
189. See id. at 76.
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where the defendant carries the keys to freedom in his
willingness to comply with the court's directive, is essentially
a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties and
has quite properly been exercised for centuries to secure
compliance with judicial decrees.""9
It is not clear from the Court's language in Uphaus whether it
was simply rejecting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
claim on the facts of that particular case, or whether it was holding
more generally that the Clause is not applicable to coercive contempt
sanctions. The Court has since characterized its holding in Uphaus in
the latter way, stating that it "had no difficulty finding the Eighth
Amendment inapplicable" to the judgment of coercive civil contempt
in that case."'
The Court offered that characterization in Ingraham v. Wright,"
in an effort to establish that the Eighth Amendment applies only in
criminal cases and thus does not restrict the use of corporal
punishment in the public schools. 93 Ingraham's entire discussion of
the scope of the Eighth Amendment is now of dubious value,
however, for the Court markedly revised its understanding of the
Eighth Amendment in Austin, which held that the Excessive Fines
Clause applies to civil forfeiture proceedings."9 Although in Austin
the Court did not expressly overrule Ingraham's apparent holding
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only applies in
criminal cases, it cast considerable doubt on the continued vitality of
that holding. Indeed, in Austin, the Court made plain its view that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, as well as the Excessive
Fines Clause, applies to any government-imposed punishment,
whether that punishment is meted out in a criminal case or a civil
case.
95
Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning in Uphaus and Ingraham has
influenced what limited discussion there is in the case law of the
190. Id. at 81 (quoting Green, 356 U.S. at 197 (Black, J., dissenting)).
191. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1977); see also United States v. Dien,
598 F.2d 743, 745 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
does not apply to coercive contempt sanctions, and stating that in Uphaus and Ingraham
the Supreme Court took "the position that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to [a
coercive contempt] sentence").
192. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
193. See id. at 664,668-71.
194. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,622 (1993).
195. See id. at 608-10; see also City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 517 N.W.2d 689, 699 n.13
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (suggesting that Uphaus may not have survived the Court's decision
in Austin), affd, 532 N.W.2d 690 (Wis. 1995).
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question at hand-whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to
coercive contempt sanctions. Although the Supreme Court has
expressly stated that its decisions on the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause are not controlling in cases involving the
Excessive Fines Clause,1 6 and although it has made clear that the
level of punishment necessary to trigger the Excessive Fines Clause is
different from that necessary for other protections in the Bill of
Rights," the courts have previously looked to Uphaus and Ingraham
for guidance on the Excessive Fines Clause issue. Actually, it is not
quite accurate to say that "courts" have looked to those cases, as only
one court, the Second Circuit, has attempted to resolve the issue."'
196. Indeed, in Alexander v. United States, 504 U.S. 544 (1993), the Supreme Court
specifically criticized the Court of Appeals for having "failed to distinguish between [the]
two components of petitioner's Eighth Amendment challenge," and then it proceeded to
emphasize the difference between the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the
Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 558. Likewise, in Browning-Ferris, the Supreme Court
stated: "Ingraham, like most of our Eighth Amendment cases, involved the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, and it therefore is not directly controlling in this Excessive
Fines Clause case." Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263 n.3
(1989). The Court also noted that "[t]he insights into the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment reached in Ingraham and similar cases ... are highly instructive," id., but as
discussed in the text, Ingraham's suggestion that the Eighth Amendment only applies to
criminal cases has now been discredited, see Austin, 509 U.S. at 608-10.
197. For example, in United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996), the Court held that
the threshold at which a sanction constitutes punishment is lower for the Excessive Fines
Clause than it is for the Double Jeopardy Clause, so that the Excessive Fines Clause may
apply to a sanction even though the Double Jeopardy Clause does not. See id. at 2147.
Thus, although the Court has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar
prosecution for both criminal contempt and coercive civil contempt, see Yates v. United
States, 355 U.S. 66, 74-75 (1957), the coercive contempt sanction may nonetheless contain
a sufficiently punitive component to invoke the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause.
In addition, in Austin, the Court took pains to disengage the Excessive Fines Clause
inquiry from the strict tests articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
167, 184 (1963), and United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980), for determining
whether a civil proceeding is in fact criminal, so that all of the criminal safeguards must be
provided. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 n.6; see also King, supra note 112, at 162 ("[T]he
Court has recognized that some civil awards that fail to qualify as essentially criminal
under [the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez] test are nevertheless subject to those
provisions in the Bill of Rights that 'limit the government's power to punish,' namely the
Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses." (quoting Austin, 509 U.S. at 609)).
198. The Second Circuit has considered the issue in United States v. Mongelli, 2 F.3d 29
(2d Cir. 1993), and United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990). The issue was also
raised in International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, but the Court did not have
occasion to address it. See Petitioner's Brief at 37-40, International Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994) (No. 92-1625). Also, in Keller v. Keller, 323 P.2d
231 (Wash. 1958), the Washington Supreme Court at least assumed that the Excessive
Fines Clause applies to coercive contempt sanctions:
In a civil proceeding, the right of a constitutional court to exercise inherent
CONTEMPT SANCTIONS
That court, however, has done so twice, once before and once after
the Supreme Court's decision in Austin.
The Second Circuit's first consideration of the issue came in
United States v. City of Yonkers.1" In that case, the district court
sought to enforce a prior consent judgment in which the City of
Yonkers and various City Council members had agreed to enact
certain legislation designed to help correct unconstitutional racial
segregation in residential housing.' When the City Council refused
to enact that legislation, the district court entered a coercive
contempt order against both the City and the Council members,
imposing escalating sanctions for every day past a specified deadline
that the legislation was not enacted.201  The coercive sanctions
imposed against the City were especially steep, with fines to begin at
$100 per day and double every day until the legislation was passed, so
that the fine for day 21 would be over $100 million, for day 25 over $1
billion, and for day 30 over $50 billion.' The City appealed on
numerous grounds, including that the fines violated the Excessive
Fines Clause.
Although the Second Circuit ultimately agreed that the
prospective fines were excessive and capped them at $1 million per
day, it did so by applying the vague tenets of its general supervisory
authority.' The court refused to say that the fines violated the
Excessive Fines Clause, holding instead that the Clause does not
apply to coercive contempt sanctions.2 The court noted that it had
"already held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does
not apply to coercive imprisonment imposed as a civil contempt
sanction, ... and [that reasoning] applies to the Excessive Fines
Clause. Both clauses apply to sanctions imposed to punish past
conduct, not to sanctions imposed to secure prospective
contempt powers resulting in confinement for a fixed term is one which must be
exercised with the greatest discretion and restraint, for it is capable of arbitrary
and capricious abuse. Constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment and excessive fines provide the extreme limits of the court's
discretionary powers.
Id. at 235. In that case, the court ultimately held that the coercive sanction was
permissible. See id.
199. 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Spallone v. United
States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
200. See id. at 449.
201. See id. at 450.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 459.
204. See id. at 460.
205. See id. at 459.
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compliance."2
Interestingly, two Supreme Court Justices found an opportunity
to comment on this aspect of the Second Circuit's holding. After
losing in the Second Circuit, the City sought a stay of the judgment
pending filing and disposition of its petition for writ of certiorari.2 7
The Supreme Court denied the application for stay, and Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote separately to concur in
that portion of the Court's decision.2°8 In his opinion, Justice Marshall
briefly addressed and rejected the City's contention that the coercive
contempt fines violated the Excessive Fines Clause. Justice Marshall
explained:
[I]t appears settled that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause does not apply to civil contempt sanctions. This is
not surprising since the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, like the Excessive Fines Clause, applies to
punishments for past conduct, while civil contempt sanctions
are designed to secure future compliance with judicial
decrees. In any event, even assuming that the size of
monetary contempt sanctions is limited by the Excessive
Fines Clause or even the Due Process Clause, I do not think
that the fines against the city, as modified by the Court of
Appeals, are unreasonable.2'
After the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Austin, the
Second Circuit had another opportunity to consider the applicability
of the Excessive Fines Clause to coercive contempt fines. In that
case, United States v. Mongelli, 1° the Second Circuit was obliged to
contend with the fact that the Excessive Fines Clause can apply to
civil fines. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its position
that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to coercive civil
contempt sanctions, again relying on the "keys to the prison"
206. Id. at 459 (citing United States v. Dien, 598 F.2d 743, 745 (2d Cir. 1979)); see also
City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 517 N.W.2d 689, 698-99 & n.13 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994)
(likening driver's license revocation to civil contempt, and relying on Yonkers for the
proposition that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to sanctions imposed to gain
compliance with court orders), affd, 525 N.W.2d 732 (Wis. 1994).
207. See Spallone v. United States, 487 U.S. 1251, 1251 (1988).
208. See idL at 1251-58 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part from the
disposition of stay motions). The majority granted the applications for stay submitted by
the individual Council members. See id. at 1251. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented
in part from that decision. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
from the disposition of stay motions).
209. Id. at 1257 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part from the
disposition of stay motions) (citations omitted).
210. 2 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1993).
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rationale."' In response to the defendants' argument that coercive
fines of $10,000 for each business day that they refused to testify
before the grand jury violated the Excessive Fines Clause, the court
stated that "appellants need only appear before the grand jury and
testify to avoid the payments they consider excessive., 212 Using this
same reasoning, the court also distinguished Austin: "Unlike coercive
fines, civil forfeitures do not attempt to secure compliance with a
court order by the defendant, and the defendant cannot avoid paying
by compliance. 2 13  The Second Circuit thus concluded that the
Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to coercive civil contempt
sanctions, because such sanctions "are not punitive in nature.21 4
The reasoning in these cases-not only the Second Circuit's
Excessive Fines Clause cases, but also the Supreme Court's decision
in Uphaus2i -is fundamentally unsound. The results in all of these
cases are founded almost entirely on the "keys to the prison"
rationale, that is, on the notion that because the defendant could have
avoided the coercive sanction by complying with the court's order,
the sanction itself is not punitive, even in part.
That rationale, however, does not withstand scrutiny. In the first
place, the fact that the defendant has the power to avoid the coercive
fine (or imprisonment) does not change the character of that fine (or
imprisonment) once it is imposed. The coercion in a coercive
contempt order is achieved through the threat of punishment. The
court, in essence, announces the punishment in advance, in the hope
that the defendant will prefer compliance to imposition of the
threatened punishment. If, however, the defendant still refuses to
comply, the court imposes the punishment in order to make good its
threat. The fact that the defendant had the opportunity to choose
compliance instead does not mean that the punishment that was
threatened and eventually imposed is somehow drained of all
punitive content.
21 6
211. See id. at 30.
212. Id. The district court had originally set the coercive fines at $4000 per business
day, but it later raised the amount to $10,000 per business day. See id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 372 (1959); see supra notes 187-90 (discussing
Uphaus).
216. Ronald Goldfarb makes the point even more starkly:
[The argument that civil contemnors carry the keys to their own prison door] is
the rationale by which the punishment of civil contempts is considered unlike
other criminal punishments and not a true sanction, since the man imprisoned
can control his incarceration by doing a required act. By such specious reasoning
19981
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Indeed, the mere fact that the defendant had the opportunity to
choose to comply rather than endure the penalty cannot usefully
serve to distinguish coercive contempt sanctions from criminal
contempt sanctions or any other criminal sanctions. The Supreme
Court itself made this point in International Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell, 17 its most recent decision concerning contempt
law. In Bagwell, the trial court had entered an injunction that
prohibited the defendant labor union from engaging in various
obstructionist activities at the plaintiff companies.218 After numerous
violations of the injunction, the trial court announced a coercive
sanction: a fine of $100,000 for each future violent breach of the
injunction and $20,000 for each future nonviolent breach."9 Over the
next several months, the court levied more than $64 million in fines
against the labor union pursuant to its coercive order, of which
approximately $52 million was payable to the Commonwealth of
Virginia and the affected counties.' On appeal, the Virginia
Supreme Court upheld the sanctions, rejecting the union's argument
that the contempt fines were in fact criminal in nature and could not
be imposed without the requisite constitutional protections.2'
Before the United States Supreme Court, the Commonwealth
argued that the trial court's prospective announcement of the
sanctions for future contemptuous behavior was dispositive. It
contended that the establishment of "a prospective fine schedule
allowed the union to 'avoid paying the fine[s] simply by performing
the ... act required by the court's order,' ... and thus transformed
these fines into coercive, civil ones. '' m The Supreme Court, however,
emphatically rejected this argument:
Due Process traditionally requires that criminal laws provide
prior notice both of the conduct to be prohibited and of the
sanction to be imposed. The trial court here simply
it follows that if he does not cooperate to attain his release he is not truly being
punished, but is doing some masochistic act which the state cannot control and
for which it is not responsible.
GOLDFARB, supra note 112, at 59; see also supra note 166 and accompanying text
(discussing the punitive aspect of coercive contempt sanctions).
217. 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
218. See id. at 823.
219. See id. at 824.
220. See icl The Court treated $12 million of the fines as payable to the companies,
presumably as compensation. See id.
221. Bagwell v. United Mine Workers, 423 S.E.2d 349, 356-58 (Va. 1992), rev'd, 512
U.S. 821 (1994).
222. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 834-35.
223. Id. at 836 (quoting Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624,632 (1988)).
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announced the penalty-determinate fines of $20,000 or
$100,000 per violation-that would be imposed for future
contempts. The union's ability to avoid the contempt fines
was indistinguishable from the ability of any ordinary citizen
to avoid a criminal sanction by conforming his behavior to
the law."'
In essence, the Court recognized in Bagwell that the conditional
nature of the coercive contempt sanction is not unique; rather,
criminal sanctions as well as coercive contempt sanctions are
conditional on noncompliance, and thus are avoidable by compliance
with the requirements of the law. As Justice Ginsburg explained in
her concurring opinion, "any fine is 'conditional' upon compliance or
noncompliance before its imposition."'  This point, however,
substantially undermines the "keys to the prison" rationale. That
rationale is based on the notion that, because the defendant can avoid
a coercive sanction by complying with the court's order, any sanction
imposed cannot be characterized as punishment. Yet the Supreme
Court has now expressly acknowledged that even in the traditional
224. Id. at 836-37. In Bagwell, the Court eventually held that the fines were criminal in
nature, citing a variety of other factors as well:
The fines are not coercive day fines, or even suspended fines, but are more
closely analogous to fixed, determinate, retrospective criminal fines which
petitioners had no opportunity to purge once imposed....
... The union's sanctionable conduct did not occur in the court's presence
or otherwise implicate the court's ability to maintain order and adjudicate the
proceedings before it. Nor did the union's contumacy involve simple, affirmative
acts, such as the paradigmatic civil contempts examined in Gompers. Instead,
the Virginia trial court levied contempt fines for widespread, ongoing, out-of-
court violations of a complex injunction. In so doing, the court effectively
policed petitioners' compliance with an entire code of conduct that the court
itself had imposed. The union's contumacy lasted many months and spanned a
substantial portion of the State. The fines assessed were serious, totaling over
$52 million. Under such circumstances, disinterested factfinding and
evenhanded adjudication were essential, and petitioners were entitled to a
criminal jury trial.
Id. at 837-38 (footnotes omitted).
225. Id. at 846 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(emphasis added). Justice Ginsburg explained more fully:
[W]ere we to accept the logic of Bagweli's argument that the fines here were
civil, because "conditional" and "coercive," no fine would elude that
categorization. The fines in this case were "conditional," Bagwell says, because
they would not have been imposed if the unions had complied with the
injunction. The fines would have been "conditional" in this sense, however, even
if the court had not supplemented the injunction with its fines schedule; indeed,
any fine is "conditional" upon compliance or noncompliance before its
imposition.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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criminal arena, defendants have the opportunity to avoid any
sanction simply by complying with the law. Surely traditional
criminal sanctions cannot therefore be treated as nonpunitive, and
neither can coercive contempt sanctions. In other words, the
characteristic of avoidability is simply not enough to render a sanction
non-punitive. Thus, although the Court continued to pay lip service
to the "keys to the prison" rationale in Bagwell, its analysis in the
case demonstrates the inadequacy of that rationale.
Perhaps sensing this, the Court in Bagwell made an effort to
distance coercive day fines and suspended fines from prospectively
announced fines.2  But the logic of the Court's analysis does not
sustain the asserted distinction. Even coercive day fines and
suspended fines are imposed, or at least become irrevocable, only
after the defendant fails to comply with the terms of the court's order.
In this sense, these coercive fines are also retrospective: when they
are ultimately extracted, the fines are fixed sanctions imposed for past
conduct. These fines too are thus "closely analogous to fixed,
determinate, retrospective criminal fines which [defendants have] no
opportunity to purge once imposed." m In other words, when the
court actually imposes the previously announced sanction, even in the
context of coercive day fines and suspended fines, it does so as a
direct result of the defendant's past conduct. Thus, sanctioning a
contemnor "until he does a certain act is as much a punishment of his
original refusal to do that same act as it is a coercion of his doing it in
the future."2 The essential point is that the punitive and remedial
purposes of coercive contempt are inherently intertwined.
Thus, while in the coercive contempt setting the punishment is
threatened and imposed in the pursuit of a remedial goal-to obtain
compliance with the court's order-it nevertheless remains
226. See id. at 828 (describing several paradigms of coercive civil contempt and noting
that, because the defendant may purge the contempt and obtain his release, he "thus
'carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket"' (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911)); see also supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's use of the "keys to the prison" rationale).
227. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 837. Specifically, the Court stated:
The fines are not coercive day fines, or even suspended fines, but are more
closely analogous to fixed, determinate, retrospective criminal fines which
petitioners had no opportunity to purge once imposed. We therefore decline to
conclude that the mere fact that the sanctions were announced in advance
rendered them coercive and civil as a matter of constitutional law.
Id.
228. Id.
229. GOLDFARB, supra note 112, at 60.
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punishment, at least in part. This is true despite the fact that the
defendant could have avoided the punishment. As Ronald Goldfarb
so persuasively concluded, "the unalterable and crucial fact remains
that a man is imprisoned in civil contempt cases as a legal
consequence of his past and current conduct, no matter what logical
legerdemain is employed about prison keys and doors or future
conduct."
c. Consistency with the Purposes Underlying the Clause
From both a theoretical and practical standpoint, coercive
contempt sanctions constitute punishment, at least in part, and thus
come within the purview of the Excessive Fines Clause as the Court
construed it in Austin. 1 This result is entirely consistent with the
purposes that underlie the Clause; indeed, perhaps in this area more
than any other, the protection afforded by the Clause is a critically
important limitation on a single judge's virtually unchecked power to
punish.
As described above, a primary motivation behind the enactment
of the Eighth Amendment and its precursor, Article 10 of the English
Declaration and Bill of Rights, was the desire to restrict the vast
power of judges to impose virtually unlimited monetary fines on the
litigants that came before them.2 Today, the danger of such judicial
excess is most pronounced in the area of contempt, and particularly in
the area of coercive civil contempt.
Contempt is unique in that "[u]nlike most areas of law, where a
legislature defines both the sanctionable conduct and the penalty to
be imposed, civil contempt proceedings leave the offended judge
solely responsible for identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, and
sanctioning the contumacious conduct."' 3 Further, in contempt (and
230. Id. at 61; see also Dudley, supra note 14, at 1063 (criticizing the "keys to the
prison" rationale on the ground that "[it assumes] that the court's findings are correct, i.e.,
that the contemnor has violated the order and has the present ability to comply, factual
issues that are frequently in serious dispute and upon which the court's potential bias may
have come into play"); Comment, supra note 166, at 125 (criticizing the "keys to the
prison" rationale). But cf Andr6, supra note 12, at 1086-87 (arguing that the "keys to the
prison" rationale is a "fair factual description" of the difference between criminal and civil
contempt, but contending that it is not a persuasive justification for denying the right of
review to a civil contemnor).
231. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993); see also supra text
accompanying note 97 (quoting a portion of the Court's analysis in Austin).
232 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
233. International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagweil, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994);
see also Raveson, supra note 50, at 7 ("Unlike ordinary criminal proceedings, where
prosecution must be initiated by the executive branch and crimes are defined by the
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again, unlike most areas of law), there is no maximum limit on the
penalty that a judge can impose.' Thus, in the prosecution and
adjudication of contempt, judges have unparalleled power: they are
in a position to define the offense, to initiate the prosecution, and to
decide the size of the sanction. Moreover, because only defendants in
criminal, and not coercive civil, contempt proceedings are entitled to
the criminal procedural protections, the offended judge can, simply
by restructuring the sanction so that it is coercive in form, deprive the
defendant of most procedural protections, including the right to a
neutral factfinder.'
Because the judge has such a significant personal stake in
vindicating his or her own authority-either through sanctions for
past disobedience, or through sanctions designed to bend the
recalcitrant defendant to the judge's will-the potential for abuse of
this vast power is dangerously high.6 And there is, at present, no
meaningful restriction on a judge's ability to abuse the coercive
contempt power. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
federal and state judges have understood themselves to have
"relatively unlimited judicial power" to impose coercive contempt
fines,'- and the appellate courts have done little to contradict that
legislative branch, the normal controls that act as checks and balances against abusive or
mistaken exercise of the government's power to punish criminal conduct are not present
[in contempt proceedings]."); Hostak, supra note 24, at 195-96 ("The contempt power is in
considerable tension with the doctrine of separation of powers .... In such cases, the
roles of legislator, adjudicator, prosecutor, enforcer, and, in civil contempt proceedings,
fact finder are conflated and devolved upon the judge."); see also supra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text (discussing the potential for abuse of the contempt power).
234. See Dudley, supra note 14, at 1026-27 (noting that, in contempt, "there is no fixed
upper limit to the courts' sanctioning power"); id. at 1062 ("As virtually every
commentator has noted, the most serious apprehensions with regard to contempt pertain
to the essentially unlimited power granted to the judge and the grave danger of bias
stemming from the court's conflicted role in vindicating its own authority."); King, supra
note 112, at 152 n.146 ("Typically, neither contempt fines nor forfeitures are capped by
the legislature."); see also supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text (describing the lack of
limits on the courts' sanctioning power).
235. See Dudley, supra note 14, at 1067 n.165.
236. Indeed, the Supreme Court has regularly reiterated that the contempt power is
uniquely "' "liable to abuse."' " Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831 (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194, 202 (1968) (quoting Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888))). Professor King
has argued that contempt powers merit "close review," due to the "unique risk of
excessive punishment." King, supra note 112, at 87. The danger, she notes, "is not that
judges, as opposed to legislatures or juries, cannot be trusted to assess proportionate
punishment.... Instead, contempt sanctions are more likely to be disproportionate than
other penalties because of the judge's role as 'judge of his own cause.'" Id. (quoting
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 199 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled in part
by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968)).




These circumstances present the very concern that gave rise to
the Excessive Fines Clause: unfettered and easily abused judicial
power to impose excessive fines on litigants. The Clause was
designed to impose an upper limit on that power, a function that is
both necessary and appropriate with respect to coercive civil
contempt fines.
V. DETERMINING EXCESSIVENESS
Once it is established that criminal contempt fines and coercive
civil contempt fines are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause, the
courts will need to determine the proper approach to evaluating
whether particular fines are so large as to violate the Clause.239 In its
recent decisions on the Excessive Fines Clause, the Supreme Court
has given only limited guidance about how the lower courts should
conduct this excessiveness inquiry. In Austin, the Court expressly
declined to decide what factors the courts should consider for an in
rem forfeiture, preferring instead to turn the question back to the
lower courts.2' In Alexander, however, the Court at least indicated
that for a criminal forfeiture the courts should consider the extent of
the defendant's culpability and the gravity of the offense in relation to
238. As discussed above, federal and state appellate courts use only the very
generalized and forgiving "abuse of discretion" standard to review the size of coercive
contempt fines. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 39-44
and accompanying text (describing cases in which the courts assessed huge coercive fines).
239. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2146-47 (1996); Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993); see also supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text(describing the Supreme Court's two-stage approach to the Excessive Fines Clause-first,
determining whether a sanction is sufficiently punitive to come within the purview of the
Clause, and then determining whether the particular fine is so excessive as to violate the
Clause).
240. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622. In response to the Supreme Court's invitation, the
federal circuit courts of appeals have adopted various multi-factor tests for determining
when an in rem forfeiture is excessive. Many of these courts have adopted a test that
requires consideration of both the relationship of the penalty to the gravity of the offense
and the culpability of the owner and the relationship between the property and the
offense. See, e.g., United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1284 (1996); United States v. RR #1, Box 224, 14 F.3d 864, 875-76 (3d
Cir. 1994). Other courts, however, have focused more heavily on the relationship of the
property to the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir.
1994); see generally William Carpenter, Reforming the Civil Drug Forfeiture Statutes:
Analysis and Recommendations, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 1087, 1130-33 (1994) (discussing the
various approaches that courts have taken in determining whether a forfeiture is
excessive); King, supra note 112, at 109 (same); Judd J. Balmer, Note, Civil Forfeiture
Under 21 U.S.C. § 881 and the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 999, 1011-29 (1996) (same).
1998]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the value of the forfeited property.241
It is clear that the touchstone of any excessiveness inquiry should
be proportionality.242 Thus, at the center of the excessiveness test
should be an evaluation of the harshness of the penalty in relation to
the gravity of the offense.243 In addition, to provide additional
objectivity to the inquiry, courts should also compare the penalty
imposed with the penalties imposed in similar cases.2
Courts should employ this straightforward proportionality
analysis in evaluating criminal contempt sanctions under the
Excessive Fines Clause. The purpose of a criminal contempt sanction
is primarily, if not solely, to punish the defendant for the past
contemptuous conduct. In this sense, criminal contempt sanctions
operate exactly like the sanctions imposed for any other crime.
241. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559 (1993) ("It is in the light of the
extensive criminal activities which petitioner apparently conducted through this
racketeering enterprise over a substantial period of time that the question whether the
forfeiture was 'excessive' must be considered."); see also King, supra note 112, at 192-93
("[Tihe Court has already noted that excessiveness analysis for criminal forfeiture must
focus on the extent and degree of the defendant's culpability, the gravity of the offense,
and the value of the property forfeited.").
242. See Alexander, 509 U.S. at 558-59 & n.4; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-88
(1983).
243. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
244. See iUt In Solem, the Court announced a similar proportionality analysis for terms
of imprisonment under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See id. Eight years
later in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), a divided Court reconsidered how the
proportionality principle should be applied to terms of imprisonment. Although two
Justices would have overruled Solem, see id. at 965, seven Justices reaffirmed that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause contains a proportionality principle, and that the
proportionality review must include consideration of the harshness of the penalty in light
of the gravity of the offense. See id. at 966-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1009-21 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1027 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Three of those Justices, however, indicated that "intrajurisdictional and
interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of
gross disproportionality." Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Those Justices, however, seemed particularly concerned that the sentence
at issue was set by the legislature, not merely by a judge: "To set aside petitioner's
mandatory sentence would require rejection not of the judgment of a single jurist, as in
Solem, but rather the collective wisdom of the Michigan Legislature and, as a
consequence, the Michigan citizenry." Id. at 1006 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Contempt sentences, in contrast, are set by judges, not
legislatures. Moreover, the proportionality guarantee is more explicit in the Excessive
Fines Clause than in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Indeed, even Justices
Scalia and Rehnquist, who contended in Harmelin that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause contains no proportionality guarantee, see id. at 966-97, have
recognized that the Excessive Fines Clause embodies the proportionality principle, see
Alexander, 509 U.S. at 558-59 & n.4.
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Because a fine imposed to punish criminal contempt is not designed
to serve any additional purposes, there is no need to deviate from the
straightforward proportionality analysis.
With respect to coercive civil contempt, a proportionality
analysis must also be at the core of the excessiveness test. In this
special context, however, the test must also accommodate the court's
need to achieve the remedial goal (that is, to coerce compliance) in
order to secure the plaintiff's substantive rights. With this in mind,
the factors that the Court set out in United Mine Workers 5 to guide
the lower courts in setting coercive fines can serve as the starting
point for consideration of the factors that should guide the
excessiveness inquiry.
The three factors that the Court identified in United Mine
Workers are: (1) "the character and magnitude of the harm
threatened by continued contumacy"; (2) "the probable effectiveness
of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired"; and
(3) "the amount of the defendant's financial resources and the
consequent seriousness of the burden to that particular defendant."
2 *s
Although the Supreme Court has candidly acknowledged that the
lower courts have applied these factors so loosely as "to authorize a
relatively unlimited judicial power to impose noncompensatory civil
contempt fines,, 247 the factors themselves are all pertinent to the
inquiry.
The first factor-"the character and magnitude of the harm
threatened by continued contumacy" 2 _--goes to the gravity of the
threatened offense and the defendant's culpability. In an
excessiveness inquiry, this factor is critical.249 The articulation of this
factor in United Mine Workers, however, is incomplete. As the Court
has recognized, a full proportionality analysis requires an assessment
245. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,304 (1947).
246. Id.; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing United Mine
Workers).
247. International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821,830 (1994).
248. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304.
249. See Alexander, 509 U.S. at 559 (directing the lower court to consider excessiveness
"in the light of the extensive criminal activities which petitioner apparently conducted");
Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91 ("First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness
of the penalty."); King, supra note 112, at 192 ("Proportionality can only be measured in
relationship to the owner's culpability .... "); cf Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,
627-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that
with respect to monetary fines "the touchstone is value of the fine in relation to the
offense," but suggesting that with respect to in rem forfeitures the key is "the relationship
of the property to the offense").
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of the gravity of the harm threatened in relation to the harshness of
the penalty."0 In other words, the court must assess the magnitude of
the harm threatened by continued contumacy not in the abstract, but
in relation to the severity of the coercive fine.
The second factor--"the probable effectiveness of any suggested
sanction in bringing about the result desired"2'-works in
conjunction with the third factor-"the amount of defendant's
financial resources and the consequent seriousness of the burden to
that particular defendant." 2  These factors, in essence, direct the
court to set the fine at a level that will in fact coerce the defendant
into compliance. Although the Court did not make the point
expressly in United Mine Workers, it seems implicit in these factors
that courts should also try to impose fines that are no greater than
necessary to achieve compliance, in accordance with the traditional
principle that "in wielding its contempt powers, a court 'must exercise
the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' "' This part
of the inquiry recognizes that coercive contempt sanctions should be
significant enough to coerce, but not so high as to destroy the
contemnor. Consideration of these factors-a sort of calibration of
the sanction to the circumstances of the particular defendant-moves
the courts beyond a simple proportionality analysis. This extension,
however, is necessary to take account of the important remedial
purpose of coercive contempt sanctions. Thus, in an excessiveness
inquiry, courts should consider whether a coercive fine of such
severity is necessary to achieve compliance in light of the defendant's
financial resources.'
In addition to these factors, it would be useful for courts to
compare the coercive fine at issue with coercive sanctions threatened
or imposed in similar cases. The Court has recognized the value of
such an inquiry, noting that "[i]f more serious crimes are subject to
the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication
250. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291 ("Of course, a court must consider the severity of the
penalty in deciding whether it is disproportionate.").
251. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 304.
252. Id.
253. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 637 n.8 (1988) (quoting Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364,371 (1966)).
254. But see Boston, supra note 56, at 742 (arguing that punitive damages are subject
to the Excessive Fines Clause, and suggesting that the defendant's wealth should be
irrelevant in determining the severity of the punishment); Lyndon F. Bittle, Comment,
Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: An Analytical Framework for Determining
Excessiveness, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1433, 1453-54 (1987) (raising concerns about the fairness
of allowing consideration of the defendant's wealth).
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that the punishment at issue may be excessive." 5 Thus, courts should
compare the coercive fine at issue with the fines that have been
imposed on similar facts in both the same jurisdiction and in other
jurisdictions. This kind of comparative analysis should prove useful
in the coercive contempt setting, because the judge generally has no
statutory limit set on his or her sanctioning authority. In this unique
context, the comparative analysis can serve as an important means of
ferreting out a coercive contempt fine that reflects the distorting
effects of an individual judge's overreaction or bias. 6
In sum, the constitutional excessiveness inquiry for coercive civil
contempt sanctions must extend beyond the bare proportionality
analysis that suffices for criminal contempt sanctions. Based on the
preceding discussion, it would be appropriate for courts to consider
four factors in evaluating whether a particular coercive fine is so
excessive as to violate the Eighth Amendment:
(1) The gravity of the harm threatened by the contemptuous
conduct in relation to the severity of the fine imposed;
(2) The probable effectiveness of the fine in coercing
compliance in light of the defendant's financial resources;
(3) Whether the fine is greater than necessary to coerce
compliance in light of the defendant's financial resources;
and
(4) A comparison of the contempt fine at issue with
contempt fines that have been imposed in similar
circumstances in the same jurisdiction and other
jurisdictions.
In applying these factors, the courts should give substantial
weight to the first factor, as proportionality is the cornerstone of any
excessiveness inquiry under the Eighth Amendment.'
This multi-factor test should serve as a more significant check on
the courts. In emphasizing the central importance of the
proportionality analysis, the courts will be forced to consider whether
255. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291. But cf Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (indicating that such
comparative analyses are necessary under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
only if the penalty appears grossly disproportionate). See also supra note 244 (discussing
Harmelin).
256. A similar comparative approach has also been urged as a tool to help identify jury
verdicts that are based on passion or prejudice in cases presenting constitutional
challenges to punitive damage awards. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589,
1608 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
257. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 284-87.
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the magnitude of the sanction is truly justified in view of the harm
threatened in the circumstances of that particular case. In addition,
the virtually limitless scope of the second factor is constrained by the
third factor, which incorporates the long-standing concern that
contempt power should be wielded with caution and moderation.
Further, requiring courts to engage in a comparative analysis of any
fines imposed will provide a more objective check on judicial
discretion because it will push courts to look beyond the case at hand,
and thus help them avoid getting bogged down in the immediate
frustration of the defendant's recalcitrance. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, because this test for excessiveness is founded on
the Constitution, courts will be obliged to apply it much more
rigorously than they have applied the loose guidelines set forth in
United Mine Workers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The contempt power is peculiarly subject to abuse because of the
dangerous combination of judicial omnipotence and judicial bias that
the law has countenanced in this area. Of particular concern is the
courts' ability to impose severe fines in cases of criminal contempt
and coercive civil contempt, which has not, as yet, been constrained in
any meaningful way. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court
has identified a possible new tool for limiting this untrammeled
judicial authority: the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. This Article has contended that under the Court's
current jurisprudence, the Excessive Fines Clause can and should be
applied as a constitutional limitation on the fines that are imposed not
only on criminal contempt defendants, but on coercive civil
contemnors as well. Application of this provision will oblige
reviewing courts to scrutinize such fines more closely, thus
diminishing the potential for judicial abuse in this area.
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